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This study describes an experiment in which I performed a series of digital forensics 
tasks on different forms of digital media.  The experiment was conducted in order to 
determine the time needed to complete these digital forensics tasks. Findings indicate that 
disk images and forensic reports can be generated quickly, often within seconds, for 
media of small storage sizes, such as floppy disks. However, for media with large 
amounts of storage, such as an external hard drive, a single task (generating a disk image) 
can take several days to complete. 
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The Time-Cost of Digital Forensics for Archival Collections 
In these times of limited budgets, all institutions are concerned about cost. At the 
same time, as budgets are shrinking, demands on institutions are growing. The digital age 
has brought on an unprecedented amount of information, and institutions need to help 
manage it. Additionally, many institutions receive digital data from producers and 
donors, whether it is stored on hard drives, floppy disks or other media. Institutions want 
to protect, obtain and preserve this valuable data, but sometimes they are at a loss of how 
to do so.  
These institutions may consider using digital forensics to deal with their 
acquisitions. “At the most basic level, forensic practices are geared toward establishing 
the authenticity of files, conducting analysis to discern their characteristics, and 
generating documentation about what has been done and why.”1 Although originally 
developed for law enforcement, digital forensics practices are now being adopted by 
many collecting institutions, which use these tools not only to determine authenticity and 
the characteristics of the digital data, but also for the purpose of preserving materials of 
enduring value.  
However, while digital forensics can help an institution to achieve the goals discussed 
above, many are still not implementing these procedures. This could often be because of 
cost. While it is fairly easy to know the cost of the equipment required to perform these
                                               
1 Matthew G. Kirschenbaum, Richard Ovenden, Gabriela Redwine, “Digital Forensics and Born-Digital 
Content in Cultural Heritage Collections” (Washington, D.C.: Council on Library and Information 
Resources, 2010): 39, http://www.clir.org/pubs/reports/pub149/pub149.pdf (accessed January 2014). 
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 tasks, there is another factor that is also important to compute: Time. Many institutions 
wonder how long various digital forensics tasks will this. Do their staff have enough time 
to complete these tasks, given their many other responsibilities? Do they have enough 
staff to complete these tasks, or will they have to hire someone else? Will they be able to 
finish these tasks before the technology becomes obsolete? How much does this cost, in 
terms of time?  
While institutions wonder about these time costs, often they do not have the 
opportunity to experiment, and to see whether or not they do have time for digital 
forensics. However, this is a Catch-22. They want to know how long it will take before 
they start the project, but in order to determine how long the tasks will take, they must 
first start the tasks. 
In this study, I have been able to experiment with these different tasks and to 
record how long they take, but without the same demands as a professional. More 
importantly, I have the opportunity to use the equipment without purchasing it, since it 
has already been purchased by my parent institution, The University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill.  
It is my hope that the results of this paper will prove useful to institutions who are 
considering implementing digital forensics into their workflows, and that it will help 
those institutions determine the time needed to complete a certain task or project. This 
may also help institutions who are considering accessing a collection that contains digital 
materials, but are not sure if they have the resources to process these materials. Time is a 
limited resource, perhaps even more limited than funding. The aim of this paper is to see 
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how much time different digital forensics tasks require, so that institutions can better 
determine how to allocate this valuable resource. 
Literature Review  
Introduction to Digital Forensics 
Before beginning a discussion of digital forensics in cultural heritage institutions, 
it is important to understand what digital forensics is and what it is used for. It is also 
important to understand the history of digital forensics, what it can be used for, and its 
potential to uncover information. 
 There are many definitions and interpretations of digital forensics, as Jones and 
Valli note.
2
 According to Jones and Valli, the Scientific Working Group for Digital 
Evidence defines digital forensics as “any information of probative value that is either 
stored or transmitted in binary form.”3  Simson Garfinkel, a leading expert in the field, 
writes that digital forensics is “the uncovering and examination of evidence located on all 
things electronic with digital storage, including computers, cell phones, and networks.”4 
“It is concerned with discovering, authenticating, and analyzing data in digital formats to 
the standard of admissibility in a legal setting.”5  The practices of digital forensics “are 
geared toward establishing the authenticity of files, conducting analysis to discern their 
characteristics, and generating documentation about what has been done and why.”6 
Another definition, which Jones and Valli call more “usable,” is this: “Computer 
                                               
2 Andy Jones and Craig Valli, Building a Digital Forensic Laboratory( Burlington, MA: Butterworth-
Heinemann and Syngress Publishing, Inc., 2009), 7 
3 Jones and Valli, 7 
4 Simson Garfinkel, “Digital Forensics,” American Scientist 101 (2013): 370-377 
5 Kirschenbaum, Ovenden, and Redwine, 1 
6 Kirschenbaum, Ovenden, and Redwine, 31 
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forensics is the collection, preservation, analysis, and court presentation of digital-related 
evidence.”7 
 The mention of court presentation in the previous definition demonstrates the 
history of digital forensics, which, although it is now being adopted by cultural heritage 
institutions, was first created to investigate alleged crimes. Digital forensics was 
developed in the United States by federal law enforcement agents in the 1980s, when 
they “noticed the rise of white-collar crimes that were aided by these new personal 
computers.”8  As Garfinkel points out, computers can contain evidence for “a crime that 
took place in the physical world” or “cases…in which the crime was inherently one 
involving computer systems, such as hacking.”9 Because of these origins in crime 
investigation, much of the literature surrounding digital forensics discusses concepts that 
are not obviously relevant to cultural heritage institutions, such as suspects, and, as in the 
previous definition, court proceedings. However, as will be discussed later in this paper, 
digital forensics is still highly relevant for cultural heritage institutions, and many of the 
issues that concern forensics investigators, such as maintaining a chain of custody, also 
concern archivists.
10
 
 As Garfinkel says, “Digital forensics is powerful because computer systems are 
windows into the past.”11 Certainly, digital forensics presents many opportunities for 
those wishing to learn more about the past, whether it is for legal purposes or historical 
research. Many computers retain large quantities of information and savvy investigators 
can recover chat logs, email messages, Google search terms, and other kinds of data that 
                                               
7 Jones and Valli, 7 
8 Jones and Valli, 6 
9 Garfinkel, “Digital Forensics,”  370 
10 Jones and Valli, 8-9 
11 Garfinkel, “Digital Forensics,” 370 
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were created weeks, months, or even years earlier.
12
 These records can provide insight 
into an “individual’s state of mind or intent.”13  
 Despite its potential, digital forensics also presents many challenges and 
limitations. “Electronic data are easily changed, damaged or erased if handled 
improperly.” Garfinkel lists more limitations, such as that “information on a computer 
system can be changed without a trace, the scale of data that must be analyzed is vast, 
and the variety of data types is enormous”14  Data can be purposely “tampered with and 
manipulated,”15 and many mistakes can also occur in the digital forensics process, such 
as inadvertent changes to data.
16
 Finally, one key challenge of digital forensics, and the 
one that will be examined in this paper, is the time required to carry out a forensic 
investigation. As Valli and Jones point out, “With volumes of storage now in common 
use,” there may not be enough time to examine every bit of information on a device, and 
decisions must be made about what should be examined.
17
 Furthermore, although digital 
forensics can uncover a great deal of information, some might not be found, or the 
information may be incomplete.
18
  
Digital Forensics in Cultural Heritage Institutions 
 As more cultural heritage institutions receive born-digital materials and materials 
stored on removable media, they are beginning to see the value and importance of digital 
forensics for cultural heritage institutions. “The methods and tools developed by forensics 
experts represent a novel approach to key issues and challenges in the archives and 
                                               
12 Garfinkel, “Digital Forensics,” 370 
13 Garfinkel, “Digital Forensics,” 370 
14 Garfinkel, “Digital Forensics,” 370  
15 Kirschenbaum, Ovenden, and Redwine, 6 
16 Jones and Valli, 13 
17 Jones and Vali, 13 
18 Dan Farmer and Wietse Venema, Foresnic Discovery (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Addison-Wesley, 2005): 
147-150 
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curatorial community.”19 It is becoming more common for libraries, special collections 
and other collecting institutions to receive digital storage media, or even and entire 
computers, as part of an acquisition.
20
 As Lee et al. write: 
The acquisition of digital materials by collecting institutions – libraries, archives 
and museums (LAMS) – has resulted in the need to incorporate new tools and 
methods into curatorial practices. LAMS are increasingly called upon to move 
born-digital materials from removable media into more sustainable preservation 
environments…21  
 
 The amount of digital material being received is not likely to decrease. ARMA 
International estimates that ninety percent of records being created now are born digital.
22
 
This volume of digital data presents new challenges for archives and other cultural 
heritage institutions, as well as new opportunities, and digital forensics may be able to 
help these institutions take advantage of these opportunities. 
 Harvard University’s Houghton Library is one of the many institutions grappling 
with the question of what to do with digital materials. Leslie Morris, the curator of writer 
John Updike’s papers, received a “steady stream of manuscripts and papers” from 
Updike.
23
 However, in February of 2009, after the writer died, the Library received 
“approximately 50 three-and-a-half and five-and-a-quarter-inch floppy disks – artifacts 
from late in the author’s career when he, like many of his peers, began using a word 
processor.”24 At another institution, Emory University, archivists received four laptops, 
an external hard drive, and a Palm Treo personal digital assistant from writer Salman 
                                               
19 Kirschenbaum, Ovenden, and Redwine, 1 
20 Kirschenbaum, Ovenden, and Redwine, 1 
21 Christopher A. Lee, Matthew Kirschenbaum, Alexandra Chassanoff, Porter Olsen, and Kam Woods, 
"BitCurator: Tools and Techniques for Digital Forensics in Collecting Institutions," D-Lib Magazine 18: 
5/6,( May/June 2012), http://www.dlib.org/dlib/may12/lee/05lee.html (accessed January 2014). 
22 Kirschenbaum, Ovenden, and Redwine, 2 
23 Steve Kolowich, “Archiving Writer’s Work in the Age of E-Mail,” The Chronicle of Higher Education 
55:31 (April 10, 2009): 1, http://chronicle.com/article/Archiving-Writers-Work-in/22770 (accessed January 
2014) 
24 Kolowich, 1 
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Rushdie.
25
 Additionally, The Harry Ransom Center at the University of Texas Austin 
holds the computers and disks of authors such as Norman Mailer and Terrance 
McNally.
26
 The Center has reportedly been receiving born-digital items as part of 
collections for nearly twenty years, and approximately thirty-nine of the Center’s 
holdings contain electronic records, including correspondence and manuscript files on a 
variety of disks and computers.
27
 The digital materials provide valuable information 
about their creators. For example, the Tom Zigal papers contain a set of proofs created in 
Microsoft word that Zigal exchanged with his editor at The Toby Press.
28
 “Their tracked 
changes and comments provide valuable insight into the creative process.”29 
 Indeed, there are many new insights to be gained from the digital materials of 
persons and institutions. In his article, “Archiving Writer’s Work in the Digital Age,” 
Kolowich writes at length about the possibilities of these materials for literary collections 
which, evidently, have also been recognized by the archivists at the Harry Ransom 
Center. “The trappings of the digital age,” he writes, such as computers floppy disks “will 
transform the way libraries preserve and exhibit literary collections.”30  Kolowich argues, 
“The great American novelists of the digital era – the ones who own BlackBerrys, use 
Gmail, Facebook, and Twitter, and compose only on computer screens – will soon begin 
                                               
25 Kolowich, 2 
26 Matthew G. Kirschenbaum, Erika L. Farr, Kari M. Kraus, Naomi Nelson, Catherine Stollar Peters, 
Gabriela Redwine, and Doug Reside, “Digital Materiality: Preserving Access to Computers as Complete 
Environments” Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Digital Preservation (iPRES) 
(October, 2009): 106-107, 
http://mkirschenbaum.files.wordpress.com/2009/10/digitalmaterialityipres2009.pdf, (accessed January 
2014) 
27 Kirschenbaum, Farr, Kraus, Nelson, Stollar Peters, Redwine, and Reside, 106-107 
28 Kirschenbaum, Farr, Kraus, Nelson, Stollar Peters, Redwine, and Reside, 106-107 
29 Kirschenbaum, Farr, Kraus, Nelson, Stollar Peters, Redwine, and Reside, 106-107 
30 Kolowich, 2 
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shipping their hard drives off to university libraries.”31  Access to these laptops could 
potentially allow scholars to gain great insight into the minds of these writers.
32
 Although 
Kolowich focuses on literary collections, the digital materials of politicians, scholars and 
even organizations, or anyone else using a computer, could prove incredibly informative. 
“Computers today function as personal environments and extensions of self – we inhabit 
and customize our computers, and their desktops are the reflecting pool of our digital 
lives.”33 The question, then, is how to uncover these digital lives, especially when they 
are stored on seemingly obsolete media, such as the floppy disks that were donated to 
Harvard.  This is one place where digital forensics can help. 
As Rogers and John write, “At the most basic level, both digital archivists and 
digital forensics practitioners are concerned with discovering, understanding, describing 
and presenting information inscribed on digital media.”34 Using digital forensics 
techniques, library, archives and museum professionals can work to ensure the 
authenticity, integrity, and provenance of digital materials.
35
 Although the field of 
forensics might at first seem vastly different from that of archives and museums, “three 
central requirements of digital forensics match those of archivists: capturing the 
information without changing it, demonstrating that the information has not been changed 
or that the changes can be identified, and analyzing and auditing the analysis of the 
                                               
31 Kolowich, 3 
32 Kolowich, 3-5 
33 Kolowich, 7 
34 Corinne Rogers and Jeremey Leighton John, “Shared Perspectives, Common Challenges: A History of 
Digital Forensics and Ancestral Computing for Digital Heritage,” in Proceedings of the Memory of the 
World in the Digital Age: Digitization and Preservation Conference, Vancouver, British Columbia, 
Canada, September 26-28, 2012 (Vancouver, Canada: UNESCO, 2012): 2. 
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/pdf/mow/VC__Rogers_John_26_D_162
0.pdf (accessed March 2014). 
35 Lee, Kirschenbaum, Chassanoff, Olsen, and Woods, 2  
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information, again without changing it.”36 Furthermore, the same tools that are sometimes 
used to solve computer crimes can be adapted for archival purposes, allowing archivists 
to ensure the integrity of their digital materials, to recover and reconstruct files from 
source media, and to create a list of electronic files that have been donated, for example.
37
  
Using forensics techniques, archivists can capture these digital environments and piece 
together “the relationships of the materials contained within.”38 Forensics tools can also 
help archivists to make “informed preservation and access decisions” and to search 
digital media for private, sensitive or personally identifying information.
39
 Lee argues 
that the “incorporation of digital forensics methods will also be essential to the 
sustainability of archives as stewards of personally identifying information...”40 The 
specific tools that will allow an archivist to perform all of these tasks will be discussed in 
detail in a later section. 
However, digital forensics also presents unique challenges for cultural heritage 
institutions.  For example, there is the question of who owns the rights to digital 
materials. As Kolowich points out, more information is being stored in the cloud and on 
the Web, and in this environment it is not always clear who owns the information.
41
  
In addition to these legal concerns, collecting institutions must also protect the 
privacy of donors. Digital forensics may allow the archivist to uncover data that the 
                                               
36 Rogers and Leighton John, 2 
37 Kirschenbaum, Ovenden, and Redwine, 2 
38 Kirschenbaum, Ovenden, and Redwine, 25 
39 Kam Woods, Christopher Lee, and Sunitha Misra. “Automated Analysis and Visualization of Disk 
Images and File Systems for Preservation,” in Proceedings of Archiving 2013, Washington, D.C.: April 2-
5, 2013 (Springfield, VA: Society for Imaging Science and Technology, 2013): 2, 
http://ils.unc.edu/callee/p239-woods.pdf (accessed March 2014). 
40 Christopher A. Lee, "Archival Application of Digital Forensics Methods for Authenticity, Description 
and Access Provision," in Proceedings of the International Council on Archives Congress, Brisbane, 
Australia, August 20-24, 2012, 
http://ica2012.ica.org/files/pdf/Full%20papers%20upload/ica12Final00290.pdf (accessed March 2014).  
41 Kolowich, 9 
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donor did not realize he or she was donating.
42
 For example, the archivist, in creating a 
disc image of the media, may also uncover private or personally identifying 
information.
43
 Archivists may also be able to recover files that the user deleted.
44
 This 
private and deleted information could provide the archivists and future researchers with 
valuable information and insight into the creator.
45
 However, before making use of 
hidden or private data, collecting institutions should first consult with the donor, if 
possible. Woods and Lee write: 
In order to determine appropriate levels of access to data from an acquired disk, 
archivists will ideally be able to consult individual producers, representatives of 
creating organizations, detailed donor agreements, and (when appropriate) 
applicable laws that dictate who is entitled to access data. However, such 
information is often not available, and archivists must make their best 
professional judgments.
46
  
 
John echoes this sentiment, writing that maintaining good relationships with donors and 
respecting their privacy “ultimately depends on appropriate, effective and open policies 
and protocol, and astute curatorial decision-making…”47 Whether or not the collecting 
institution can make this information available should be addressed in the donor 
agreement. Lee urges professionals responsible for the care of digital materials to 
“expand the traditional notion of a donor agreement to address the various forms of 
                                               
42 Kirschenbaum, Ovenden, and Redwine, 51-53 
43 Kam Woods and Christopher A. Lee, “Acquisition and Processing of Disk Images to Further Archival 
Goals," in Proceedings of Archiving 2012, Copenhagen, June 2012 (Springfield, VA: Society for Imaging 
Science and Technology, 2012), 147-152.  http://ils.unc.edu/callee/archiving-2012-woods-lee.pdf (accessed 
March 2014). 
44 Woods, Kam, Christopher A. Lee, and Simson Garfinkel, “Extending Digital Repository Architectures to 
Support Disk Image Preservation and Access,” in JCDL '11: Proceeding of the 11th Annual International 
ACM/IEEE Joint Conference on Digital Libraries, (New York, NY: ACM Press, 2011), 57-63. 
http://www.ils.unc.edu/callee/p57-woods.pdf (accessed March 2014). 
45 Woods, Lee, and Garfinkel, 57 
46 Woods and Lee, 2012, 3 
47 Jeremy Leighton John, “Digital Forensics and Preservation,” DPC Technology Watch Report 12-03 
(Digital Preservation Coalition, November 2012), 
http://www.dpconline.org/component/docman/doc_download/810-dpctw12-03.pdf. (accessed March 2014).  
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representation that are manifested in the digital objects.”48 The person responsible for 
working with the donor in the donation of these materials should ask, for example, 
“Exactly what does the donor intend to transfer to the repository?” and “What types or 
levels of representation are particularly sensitive to the parties represented in the 
materials?”49 It is important to balance the interests of researchers with the interests of 
donors, and to give researchers access to the materials without compromising the privacy 
of the donors.
50
  Archives do not want to risk losing the trust of potential doors.
51
 John 
recommends the following steps:  
 (i) Establish open policies and procedures; (ii) inform and seek consent of donors 
and families; (iii) preview content of personal archives; (iv) discern as far as 
feasible the interests of third parties; and (v) take actions to comply with policies 
and expressed wishes.
52
  
 
Finally, forensics tools, such as fiwalk and bulk extractor, can be used to identify and 
redact private and personally identifying information.
53
 These tools will be discussed in 
more detail in a later section. 
 Digital materials and digital forensics also raise new questions about appraisal 
and selection. “Digital storage is cheap, easy and virtually unlimited,”54 and therefore 
donors may accumulate huge volumes of digital information over a lifetime, which they 
                                               
48 Christopher Lee, “Donor Agreements,” in “Digital Forensics and Born-Digital Content in Cultural 
Heritage Collections” (Washington, D.C.: Council on Library and Information Resources, 2010), 57 
http://www.clir.org/pubs/reports/pub149/pub149.pdf (accessed January 2014). 
49 Lee, “Donor Agreements,” 57 
50 Jeremey Leighton John, “The Future of Saving Our Past,” Nature 459 (June 2009): 775-776. 
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v459/n7248/full/459775a.html (accessed March 2014)  
51 John, “Digital Forensics and Preservation,” 33 
52 John, “Digital Forensics and Preservation,” 33 
53 Christopher A. Lee and Kam Woods, "Automated Redaction of Private and Personal Data in Collections: 
Toward Responsible Stewardship of Digital Heritage," in Proceedings of Memory of the World in the 
Digital Age: Digitization and Preservation: An International Conference on Permanent Access to Digital 
Documentary Heritage, 26-28 September 2012, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, edited by Luciana 
Duranti and Elizabeth Shaffer, 298-313: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 
2013. http://ils.unc.edu/callee/p298-lee.pdf (accessed March 2014) 
54 Kolowich, 10 
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may then try to donate to the institution. At some point, digital media may actually 
contain too much information. “Mining, sorting, and archiving every bit of data stored on 
an author’s [or other donor’s] computer could become a chore of paralyzing tedium and 
diminishing value.”55   Kolowich adds that, if an institution attempted to save everything, 
digging through this data could prove frustrating for scholars. He reports the perspective 
from Matthew Kirschenbaum that “unless scholars are able to find what they want in that 
sea of data, it is not worth archiving it in the first place.”56 
Trustworthiness can be another issue when dealing with digital materials, and as 
Kirshenbaum discusses, born-digital fonds are “mobile,” as they pass from the creator to 
perhaps an intermediary to the staff archival repository and then to storage and ingest into 
a digital repository.
57
 This movement can pose a threat to the trustworthiness of the 
digital objects especially when it comes to intermediaries, such as manuscript dealers or 
family members, handling the materials. Redwine et al. encourage repositories to 
communicate with donors and dealers during the transfer process, and to make donors 
and dealers aware that simply viewing the files can alter them, among other things.
58
 
Ideally, digital materials should arrive at the collecting institution with a “documented 
chain of custody (perhaps even including access history) and authentication information 
that can be verified upon arrival.”59 However, this is not always the case. Contemporary 
recordkeeping is “rarely consistent with recordkeeping ideal.”60 But an archivist 
                                               
55 Kolowich, 10 
56 Kolowich, 10 
57 Kirschenbaum, Ovenden, and Redwine, 27 
58 Gabriela Redwine, Megan Barnard, Kate Donovan, Erika Farr, Michael Forstrom, Will Hansen, Jeremy 
Leighton John, Nancy Kuhl, Seth Shaw, and Susan Thomas, “Born Digital: Guidance for Donors, Dealers, 
and Archival Repositories” (Washington, D.C.: Council on Library and Information Resources, 2013). 
http://www.clir.org/pubs/reports/pub159/pub159.pdf (accessed March 2013).  
59 Kirschenbaum, Ovenden, and Redwine, 29 
60 Lee, 2012, 3 
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presented with digital media should try, as best she can, to reconstruct the chain of 
custody from before she first encountered the media.
61
 For example: 
“an archivist acquiring a floppy disk containing records from a donor often will 
not know with certainty what the states and transitions of the records were before 
they were last saved onto that disk, but she can use various forms of information 
(e.g. other records, discussion with the donor) to make inferences about earlier 
points in the ‘life’ of the records.”62  
 
Once the archivist has acquired the media, however, she should implement more detailed 
record-keeping practices. Lee adds that for purposes of legal compliance and authenticity, 
archivists need to “document and account for all states of a record and changes of 
state….from the point of creation to each instance of use and (when appropriate) 
destruction.”63 Kirshenbaum asserts that in order for these materials to be safeguarded 
during the transfer process, “dealers and other will need to assume some level of 
responsibility for the trustworthiness of the digital files.”64 Finally, much responsibility 
lies with the repository, in addition to the intermediaries. In order to earn the trust of 
current and future donors, archival repositories should develop a strong technical 
infrastructure and a sound preservation plan, and demonstrate that the staff and repository 
are qualified to manage born-digital materials.
65
 Digital repositories should also follow 
agreed-upon models or standards, such as the Reference Model for an Open Archival 
Information System (OAIS).
66
 “Adopting forensic practices geared toward establishing a 
chain of custody and implementing a series of checks and balances to ensure that when 
                                               
61 Lee, 2012, 3 
62 Lee, 2012, 3 
63 Lee, 2012,  3 
64 Kirschenbaum, Ovenden, and Redwine, 28 
65 Kirschenbaum, Ovenden, and Redwine, 29 
66 Kirschenbaum, Ovenden, and Redwine, 29 
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digital objects arrive at an archival repository they are transferred intact and with 
appropriate documentation are two other important steps.”67   
Digital objects are also vulnerable to being altered or otherwise damaged if they 
are not properly handled by the collecting institution. As Kirshenbaum states, “the mere 
act of opening a file or booting up a computer to alter the archival materials in 
fundamental ways.”68  Even if one just turns on a computer, new data can be written to 
the hard drive.
69
 Furthermore, removable optical and magnetic media have a limited 
shelf-life. “Degradation of the media can occur due to incorrect or inadequate storage, 
damage during handling, and wear on the media during access.”70 
Collecting institutions should also strive to maintain the original order of the 
digital materials. Lee writes that although the original order of digital materials is often 
“messy and idiosyncratic,” it should be preserved because “it conveys meaningful 
information about the recordkeeping context, and additional layers of description can be 
laid on top of that order to facilitate various forms of navigation and access.”71 
Cost proves to be another barrier for cultural heritage institutions considering 
adopting digital forensics practices and collecting digital materials. “New tools and new 
training…mean new money.”72 Richard Ovenden, associate director of Oxford’s 
Bodleian Library, says that in order to adopt digital curation, most institutions will have 
to divert funds from other, “more traditional areas,” and they may not be willing to do so, 
                                               
67 Kirschenbaum, Ovenden, and Redwine, 31 
68 Kirschenbaum, Ovenden, and Redwine, 28 
69 Kirschenbaum, Ovenden, and Redwine, 28 
70 Kam Woods and Geoffrey Brown, “From Imaging to Access - Effective Preservation of Legacy 
Removable Media,” in Archiving 2009: Preservation Strategies and Imaging Technologies for Cultural 
Heritage Institutions and Memory Organizations: Final Program and Proceedings (Springfield, VA: 
Society for Imaging Science and Technology, 2009), 213-218. 
71 Lee, 2012, 3 
72 Kolowich, 11 
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at least not right away.
73
 The speed at which they adopt these practices “could be at a 
slower pace than the speed of technological invention itself.”74 Cook also supports this 
statement, and adds that there is a human cost, writing that “unless you can get 
substantial new financial and human resources, you will need to stop doing something 
important that you are doing now, and reallocate significant resources to electronic 
records, period.”75 He suggests that this problem is especially relevant to small 
institutions.
76
  Kirshenbaum adds that the full costs of providing an infrastructure for 
digital forensics is still unknown. He cites costing models such as the LIFE2 model but 
says that these methodologies “are probably too generic to provide anything more than 
broad guidance about the costs of acquiring, capturing, managing, securing, and 
providing controlled access to sensitive digital information.”77 However, he adds the cost 
of adopting these practices “is likely to be high for the foreseeable future.”78 The cost of 
equipment and software may also be a challenge, although some tools, such as the 
BitCurator environment are open source and freely distributed.
79
 Leighton John is more 
optimistic about the cost of digital forensics:  “Smaller institution will be able to do much 
with a combination of free and inexpensive tools (write blockers, open source software, 
FTK imager and others); larger institutions may be able to justify greater expenditure in 
                                               
73 Koliwich, 11 
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part so that a wide range of tools can be tried and tested for the benefit of the wider 
community….”80 
 Finally, for some, there may be a psychological barrier to working with digital 
materials. The tasks can seem daunting, perhaps overwhelming, and Cook writes that, for 
archivists, “a starting point is getting past the fear factor, and recognizing that the whole 
solution is not resting on their shoulder or actions.”81 Archivists may feel that they do not 
have enough knowledge to work with these materials, but Cook assures us that “no one is 
qualified to speak about electronic records with full authority.”82 Cook believes that no 
one has the “one answer” for perfectly capturing and managing electronic records, for 
ensuring their authenticity, or for preserving them well into the future, even as 
technologies change.
83
 He asserts that there is probably not just one solution to these 
complex problems.
84
 The solution will be different depending on a number of factors, 
including the size, complexity, and type of digital information and the resources of the 
collecting institution.
85
  Therefore, Cook adds that in order to find these solutions, 
archivists “will certainly need a vast array of tools…in our professional toolkit.”86  
 Despite the risks and drawbacks presented by digital forensics and digital 
materials, the risks of not adopting these practices, and of not collecting digital materials, 
could be far greater than the risks of doing so. In his article, “Byte-ing Off What You Can 
Chew,” Terry Cook discusses a statement made in April 2004 by Eduard Mark, a senior 
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historian with the United States Department of Air Force. According to Cook, Mark 
writes:  
I wrote a history of the invasion of Panama, which remains classified. I began my 
research within weeks of the operation and found that many electronic records 
had already been purged from computers…I will mince no words. It will be 
impossible to write history of recent diplomatic and military history…Too many 
records are gone…History as we have known it is dying, and with it the public 
accountability of government and rational public administration.
87
 
 
 Unless these and other electronic records are saved, much of the historical record may be 
lost. 
 Finally, in order to overcome many of the challenges presented by digital media, 
such as cost, training, and equipment, many in the field have suggested that cultural 
heritage institutions might work together or collaborate in order to overcome this 
seemingly-overwhelming task. For example, in “Swatting the Long Tail of Digital 
Media: A Call for Collaboration,” Ricky Erway proposes that instead of all institutions 
attempting to deal with all kinds of digital media, a few institutions could each specialize 
on certain types of media.  She writes, “A community-based approach would use SWAT 
[software and workstations for antiquated technology] sites wherein a few self-selected 
institutions acquire and maintain the gear and expertise to read data and transfer content 
from particular types of obsolete media.”88  
Key Concepts in Digital Forensics  
To understand the methods of forensic investigation carried out in this paper, it is 
important to first understand some key concepts about computers and digital storage 
media, such as how computers write and store data.  This section is not meant to be an 
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exhaustive explanation of how computers work and will focus only on the aspects of 
computers most relevant to digital forensics and to the tasks carried out in this paper. 
Computers organize, store, and retrieve data using the file system, “which means 
that it is important not only in relation to the files themselves but also to their 
metadata.”89 The file system allows users to store data “in a hierarchy of files and 
directories,” and it organizes data so that the computer knows where to find it.90 The file 
system is “independent from any specific computer.”91  File systems have specific 
procedures and structures for storing information, whether it is a small amount of data on 
a floppy disk or thousands of files on a personal computer, and this “underlying structure 
allows any computer that supports the type of file system to process it.”92 For digital 
forensics, it is important to understand the file system because this will allow the 
investigator to understand how computers write data and how deleted data can be 
recovered. Additionally, in digital forensics, file system analysis “examines data in a 
volume (i.e. a partition or disk) and interprets them as a file system.”93 File system 
analysis will allow the investigator to perform many tasks, such as listing the files in a 
directory, recovering deleted content and viewing the contents of a portion of the disk.
94
   
 The smallest discrete unit of data that a computer can handle is called a bit. The 
bits are then grouped into groups of eight called bytes, to store data.  When recorded on a 
hard drive or memory card, these bytes are grouped in blocks called sectors that are 
typically 516 or 4,096 bytes in length. A sector is the smallest block of data that a drive 
                                               
89 Kirschenbaum, Ovenden, and Redwine, 15 
90 Brian Carrier, File System Forensic Analysis (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Addison-Wesley, 2005),  174 
91 Carrier, 173  
92 Carrier, 174 
93 Carrier, 174 
94 Carrier, 177-178 
20 
 
can read or write. Each sector on the disk has a unique identifying number, called the 
sector’s logical blog address. Two or more sectors form a cluster or block. The number of 
bytes in a cluster depends on the disk’s size and on the version of the operating system 
used to format the disk.
95
 A cluster is the smallest unit of memory that an operating 
system will use to store information. Even if a file contains only two bytes, the operating 
system will still write this information to a cluster, which may be as large as 32 kilobytes. 
As a result, there is usually extra, unused space in a cluster, called slack space.  Slack 
space is useful in digital forensics because an investigator can sometimes finds remains 
of deleted files in the slack space.
96
 
 Computers write data to the disk by allocating files to specific storage sectors. 
“Allocated files are ones that can be viewed through the file system and whose contents 
under normal circumstances will not be inadvertently overwritten by the operating 
system.”97 In other words, these are the files that one can easily see on a computer 
without using any specialized software, such as through opening “My Documents” on a 
Windows operating system. The files are called “allocated” because they are assigned to 
a particular cluster or clusters on the disk, and that space cannot be taken up by another 
file. 
However, if a file is deleted by the user, then those sectors are deallocated. If that 
happens, then new data can be written to those sectors. They are no longer assigned to the 
old data.  As Kirshenbaum writes, “The ‘delete’ command simply tells the file system to 
make the clusters associated with a given file available again for future use.”98 However, 
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sometimes the space is not immediately allocated to a new file. In those instances, the file 
may continue to be stored in memory, on the hard drive, or on external media, “even 
though the metadata that could be used to locate it are lost.”99 Even when users delete a 
file, it remains on the disk, in unallocated data blocks and in unallocated file attribute 
blocks, until it is overwritten by other data.
100
 When a user deletes a file, the computer 
does not immediately wipe the file from its memory. Instead, it marks the space as 
available for future data, but the old file will not be erased until something new is written 
into that memory space.
101
 As Farmer and Venema write, “Destroying information turns 
out to be difficult. Memory chips can be read even after a machine is turned off. Data on 
a magnetic disk can be recovered even after it has been overwritten multiple times.”102 
Information about the files, called MAC (modified, accessed, created/changed) times, 
also can survive  for several months or even years.
103
 
 Data from deallocated sectors (that is, data that has been deleted by the user but 
not overwritten by new data) can be recovered using a technique called file carving.
104
  A 
file carver makes use of “characteristic sequences of bytes at the beginning and end of 
each file…called file headers and footers.”105  
 Computers can also use a technique called compression is to “squeeze data” so it 
uses less storage.
106
 However, compressed data can be more difficult to reconstruct 
through file carving.
107
  For example, if the file has been compressed, it may be corrupted 
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or partially missing.
108
  However, compression can also be useful in digital forensics, 
because compressed data can be processed more quickly.
109
  
Another key concept is that of hash functions. A hash function generates a unique, 
fixed-length sequence of characters. As Garfinkel writes, “Hash functions are designed so 
that changing a single character in the input,” that is, in the bits that generate the hash, 
“results in a completely different output,” which is the string.110 However, occasionally, 
two different groups of bits will generate the same hash, which is called a hash collision, 
although this is rare.
111
 Hash functions are useful both for ensuring that data has not been 
changed and for recognizing specific files.
112
 
Random Access Memory (RAM) is also of interest to digital forensics 
investigations. “RAM gets its name because the data in its stores can be accessed in any 
order.”113 Because RAM can be accessed quickly, it is often used for temporary storage 
and working space for the computer’s operating systems.114 But RAM can prove 
challenging for forensic examiners, because its contents change quickly and are gone 
shortly after a computer is turned off.
115
 In order to capture RAM, the examiner must use 
a dedicated program (a memory imager).
116
 This information is then stored in its own 
special kind of file, called a memory dump.
117
 RAM might contain a lot of useful 
information, such as bits of programs that have been recently run and closed, but it is also 
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very difficult to capture and, when captured, is usually incomplete.
118
 However, 
archivists rarely collect data from the RAM, since archivists most often collect digital 
data from a donor’s computer after they are no longer actively using that computer. 
Tools and Procedures 
 To perform a digital forensics investigation, it is necessary not only to have the 
correct tools to carry out the investigation, but also to know how and when to use them. 
In this section, I will briefly describe some basic steps in a digital forensics workflow as 
well as some key tools. Again, this is not meant to be an exhaustive description of every 
possible tool and every possible step, but is instead meant to give a general idea. 
Additionally, the tools and steps used here will be the ones used most in the procedure 
later described in this paper. 
 Kirschenbaum et al. discuss pre-accession procedures. They write that “the 
transfer process for digital materials needs to be managed carefully, and with rigorous 
adherence to documented procedures incorporating standard elements of archival 
accessing that have been adapted to the needs of digital objects.”119 When transferring 
materials, it is crucial to take any steps necessary to minimize risk to the materials.
120
 
Kirshenbaum also stresses the importance of documentation, completing a transfer list 
which contains information such as ownership and permissions, and of the “generation of 
checksums for comparison in future integrity checks.”121  
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 Both before and during access, it is important for collecting institutions to 
communicate with donors.
122
 As has been mentioned previously, it is important that 
donors understand that the institution may be able to recover files that the donor had not 
intended to donate, such as deleted files.
123
 Additionally, the donor should understand the 
accessioning process and policies so that they can provide “necessary information and 
guidance.”124 Additionally, the collecting institution should be certain that it will be able 
to “gather sufficient information to establish an appropriate level of physical, 
administrative, and intellectual control over the materials being transferred.”125 The 
institution needs to establish guidelines about what kinds of records, curatorial area, and 
creators they will focus on.
126
 The institution needs to be certain that the scale of the 
potential donation fits the scale of their institution.
127
 That is, do they have the resources 
to make these digital materials available in a timely manner?
128
 Additionally, do they 
have the technical knowledge and infrastructure to properly transfer and preserve these 
records?
129
  The institution must also be certain that they will be able to gain legal 
custody of the records.
130
 Finally, it is important that institutions not delay in the 
accessing process, as accessing “benefits from being carried out as soon as possible after 
selection, to better ensure preservation and integrity of digital content.”131 
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Glisson and Maxwell provide a description of a typical digital forensics 
workflow. First, “one must decide where to store the information.”132 Additionally, the 
target drive, that is, where the information will be stored, should be forensically cleaned, 
to wipe any data that might be lingering on the target device, which could be confused 
with the new information.
133
 The next step is to record information about the hardware, 
such as serial numbers and manufacturer information.
134
 Then, the next step is to “start 
the chain of custody and to transport the device to a secure lab for processing.”135   
 Once the device has been transported, “a bit stream copy of the removable media 
should be made by creating either a clone or a forensic image of the device.”136 Garfinkel 
provides an explanation of the process of creating this copy, also called a disk image:  
To preserve the data on a computer or phone, each of these sectors must be 
individually copied and stored on another computer in a single file called a disk 
image or physical image. This file, which contains every byte from the target 
device, naturally includes every visible file. But the physical image also records 
invisible files, as well as portions of files that have been deleted but not yet over-
written by the operating system.
137
  
 
Additionally, by using a disk image during “triage and analysis tasks,” instead of using 
the source media, the examiner can reduce the risk of erasing or otherwise damaging the 
source media. 
138
 Across several collecting institutions, Gengenbach found that the 
creation of forensic disk image is a “central,” important part of the workflow.139 Write-
                                               
132 Brad Glisson and Rob Maxwell, “A Digital Forensics Workflow,” in, Digital Forensics and Born-
Digital Content in Cultural Heritage Collections (Washington, D.C.: Council on Library and Information 
Resources, 2010), http://www.clir.org/pubs/reports/pub149/pub149.pdf (accessed January 2014), p. 16 
133 Glisson and Maxwell, 16 
134 Glisson and Maxwell, 16 
135 Glisson and Maxwell, 16 
136 Glisson and Maxwell, 16 
137 Garfinkel, “Digital Forensics,” 372 
138
 Woods, Lee, and Misra, 240 
139 Martin J. Gengenbach, “The Way We Do it Here': Mapping Digital Forensics Workflows in Collecting 
Institutions,” A Master’s Paper for the M.S. in L.S degree, August, 2012. 
http://digitalcurationexchange.org/system/files/gengenbach-forensic-workflows-2012.pdf (accessed March 
2014) 
26 
 
blocking hardware should be used in this process to avoid accidental changes to the data, 
and this hardware should be tested before being used on the data.
140
  The data then needs 
to be authenticated using hash functions which, as discussed in the previous section, will 
ensure that the data are identical.
141
 Institutions might make several copies of the disk 
image, and keep one “isolated” as a master copy, while another is used to create access 
copies for researchers.
142
 
 Next, the examiner should identify active files and inactive files. “Active files are 
readily identifiable and can be access with the appropriate software and, in some cases, 
the required security information.”143 Inactive files, or deleted files, can be found in 
allocated space and slack space, as previously discussed. Furthermore, other tools allow 
the user to extract files from the disk image, to search for a specific word or phrase within 
the files, or to find encrypted data.
144
 The examiner can then extract the relevant data 
from the disk image “so that they are easier to analyze”145 As Woods et al. write, “the 
disk image can be mounted on a host system or in a virtual machines…and any readable 
filesystems can be explore manually.”146 The examiner can also use commercial tools 
such as FTK Imager to identify and explore “both the filesystems and unallocated 
spaces.”147 However, there are issues with these approaches. For example, manually 
exploring the file system can be “error prone” and time consuming and may not yield 
useful results.
148
 Furthermore, the tool previous mentioned, FTK Imager, is free but has 
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“a limited set of filesystem analysis utilities,” and tools with more capabilities might also 
cost more.
149
  
 Once a collecting institution has captured the digital materials, they may then 
wish to arrange and describe them. The AIMS working group notes that “success within 
arrangement and description of born-digital materials can be describe in the same way as 
traditional archival records.”150  That is, the institution should work to preserve the 
context in which the records were “created, managed, assembled or accumulated.”151 To 
do so, collecting institutions should strive, throughout the accessing and capture process, 
to gather evidence of the context and preserve the metadata embedded within the files.
152
 
The institution should also strive to maintain intellectual control over the materials and to 
provide some means of discovery of the materials, such as a finding aid.
153
 The AIMS 
working group also stresses the importance of documenting the processing of the 
materials.
154
  
 As the AIMS Work group writes, “Discovery and access workflows…are shaped 
by the needs of user communities, but also need to be carried out with regard to legal and 
ethical issues relating to the material and the information contained within it.”155  
Understanding the user needs and user base of a collecting institution can be especially 
difficult with digital materials. Since digital materials are often made available online, 
users often have less interaction with the archivists, and the institution can become less 
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familiar with its user base.
156
 Additionally, although having materials online allows for 
wider access, it also “significantly increases the risk of misuse or abuse of copyrighted or 
sensitive information.”157 It is important to mitigate these risks in order to protect the 
interests and maintain the trust of the donor. The AIMS working group suggests that 
institutions provide “clear statements regarding usage rights, clear and effective policies 
on restriction and data curation and [demonstrate to donors] a working system of access 
restrictions and long-term preservation.”158   
There are many digital forensics methods which could be used throughout this 
process and which could support the goals and functions of collecting institutions. Chief 
among these is the creation of disk images. Disk images can, for example, help collecting 
institutions ensure the provenance, integrity, authenticity of digital materials.
159
 “Both the 
file system metadata within the disk image and the supplementary metadata within the 
disk image package can be used to document provenance and chain of custody.”160 
Acquiring a disk image would also allow an institution to perform “data triage and data 
integrity tasks,” such as creating cryptographic hashes and “creating maps and hierarchies 
of allocated and unallocated space on the original device.”161  
Additionally, as previously mentioned, by acquiring disk images, collecting 
institutions also lessen the risk that they will damage the source media.
162
 “Disk images 
allow researchers to retain and investigate aspects of the systems that could be 
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inadvertently altered during normal operating of a typical operating system.”163 The 
original media could also degrade, and using the original media limits patron access.
164
 If 
an institution chose to have patrons access the original source media, only one patron 
could access the media at the same time, and patrons would probably have to use a 
designated work station.
165
 Furthermore, the “speed of access” is usually higher when 
using disk images as opposed to accessing the original source media.
166
  
Disk images can also provide collecting institutions and researchers with 
contextual information. A disk image “provides the user with valuable information about 
how the device was organized, who uses, and which users had access to particular 
contents on the device.”167 Disc images “that contain complete operating systems capture 
significant information about the ‘digital ecosystem’ in which the documents and media 
were created.”168 Furthermore, as previously mentioned, disk images may uncover 
damaged data, private data, or data that was thought to be lost or deleted.
169
  By using 
disk images, the repository will not need to be concerned about having equipment to 
mount the source media.
170
 Despite these benefits, Woods and Lee reported that 
“generation and management of disk images remains relatively rare in current 
repositories.”171  
Disc images are typically saved in either raw (also known as dd) format, in ISO 
format (for optical media) or as forensically packaged disk image formats, such as the 
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Advanced Forensic Format (AFF) or Guidance Software’s Evidence Witness Format 
(E01). While raw disc images have the advantage of being widely supported by many 
software tools, hey also have many limitations. “As sector-by-sector copies of the drive 
contents, they do not retain additional metadata about the capture process or supporting 
actions performed during acquisitions.”172 In contrast, AFF and E01 include both the disk 
images and metadata generated during imaging. This metadata can provide insight into 
the user who performed the capture, the system that performed the imaging, the physical 
storage medium as well as cryptographic checksums and timestamps.
173
 These formats 
may also provide information about areas of the source media that might be damaged, as 
well as manufacturer data associated with the media.
174
 “This information may be used to 
support technically consistent workflows, improve records of provenance, and assess 
issues associated with authenticity and duplication.”175 
 Garfinkel also discusses “file-based approaches” to digital forensics, which are 
“widely used” and “implemented by popular tools such as guidance Software’s 
EnCase…and AccessData’s FTK.”176 File-based approaches are useful because they are 
easy to understand, since “they mirror the way that users interact with computers.”177 
However, “They have the disadvantage of ignoring data not contained within files.”178 
Another approach to digital forensics, as discussed by Garfinkel, is bulk data analysis. In 
this approach, “Digital content is examined without regard to file system metadata. 
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Instead, data of interested is identified by content and processed, extracted, and reported 
as necessary.”179 Bulk data approaches also “have the advantage of being applicable to all 
types of computers systems, file systems and file types.”180 
One set of tools that can be used to analyze a disk image is the BitCurator 
environment. “BitCurator incorporates software designed to improve coverage and 
efficiency when analyzing disk images, and reduce the potential for error when handling 
these materials in archival workflows.”181 The BitCurator environment “use[s] and 
expand[s] on tools including Simson Garinkel’s fiwalk and bulk extractor and Basis 
Technology’s The Sleuth Kit to produce human readable reports using technical metadata 
extracted from raw and forensically packaged images”182 Furthermore, “the data 
generated by these tools can be used to improve triages of and access to digital collection, 
and to support a range of preservation decisions.”183  
 Bulk extractor is a tool that performs bulk analysis, which was discussed 
previously. In the BitCurator environment, bulk extractor “is employed to identify 
potentially private and sensitive information, and to search for relevant patterns in the 
bitstream specified by the user. Bulk extractor does not parse filesystems but instead 
reads the raw contents of the disk image.”184 
Fiwalk is a “disk image parsing tool”185 which “identifies and interprets the 
contents of filesystems contained in disk images…”186 It “can produce both XML (as 
digital forensics ML) and simple text reports on the processed media: filesystem(s) and 
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volume(s) encountered, file objects and associated metadata within a given filesystem, 
and information on byte runs associated with file fragments.”187  Fiwalk can “generate 
reports of all files on a drive, along with their associated filesystem metadata and 
locations within the filesystem hierarchy”188  
In order to generate reports about which files contain information of interest, such 
as personally identifying information, another tool, identify_filesnames.py, can also be 
used.
189
 This tool matches this information found by bulk extractor to the file from which 
it came.
190
 This is necessary because “bulk extractor ignore filesystem structure.”191  
 Once the disk image has been processed, the BitCurator environment will produce 
two sets of data. The first is “a detailed report – based on Digital Forensics XML – on 
data from the filesystem” and “details the filesystem hierarchy information in a single 
XML file using the current set of Digital Forensics XML tags.” Digital Forensics XML is 
an XML schema which represents “an initiative to enable to production of interoperable 
metadata by digital forensics tools.”192 Some of the current DFXML tags include 
“volume structure, permissions, [and] timestamps…”193 “With this metadata, one can 
rapidly produce informative, human-readable reports,” which include information such as 
“timelines of modification,” “location and contents of user accounts,” and “’hidden 
data.’”194 
  The second set of data that will be generated by the BitCurator environment, after 
the disk image has been processed, is “sets of features corresponding to information 
                                               
187 Woods, Lee, and Misra, 3 
188 Woods and Lee, 2012, 4 
189 Woods, Lee, and Misra, 3 
190 Woods, Lee, and Misra, 3 
191 Woods, Lee, and Misra, 3 
192 Lee, Kirschenbaum, Chassanoff, Olsen, and Woods, 3 
193 Woods, Lee, and Misra, 5 
194 Woods, Lee, and Misra, 5 
33 
 
within the filesystem that may be private, sensitive, individually identifying, or indicative 
of specific actions on the part of the user.”195 The BitCurator environment can generate 
reports from the contents of the disk image and the DFXML outputs.
196
 The reports show 
the distribution of data on the disk and indicate areas likely to contain large amounts of 
private data.
197
 The reports can also show if an external device was used, and can create a 
timeline of email activity.
198
 
 Woods et al. provide some insight into the time cost of processing materials using 
the BitCurator environment. They write, “The time required to process a given disk 
image with fiwalk, bulk extractor, the annotation tool, and the BitCurator reporting 
module is a function not only of the processing and disk speed of the workstation, but 
also on the composition of the disk images.”199 Furthermore, images with larger amounts 
of data take longer, and smaller amounts take less time.
200
 In terms of time, “The limiting 
factor…is generally the BitCurator report generation tool, which may have to process 
extremely large text feature reports and XML file system repots as produced by bulk 
extractor and fiwalk.
201
  
 Another tool that will be used in this paper is the FRED (Forensic Recovery of 
Evidence Device), a specialized computer produced by Digital Intelligence. According to 
the company’s website, “FRED systems are optimized for stationary laboratory 
acquisition and analysis.”202 The FRED station is useful for digital forensics because it 
has extensive memory, which is useful for processing and well as creating disk images. 
                                               
195 Woods, Lee, and Misra, 1 
196 Lee and Woods, 2013, 305-306 
197 Lee and Woods, 2013, 305-306 
198 Lee and Woods, 2013, 305-306 
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201 Woods, Lee, and Misra, 4-5 
202 Digital Intelligence, http://www.digitalintelligence.com/products/fred/ Accessed March 2014. 
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The FRED contains several memory drive bays as well as a drive cooling system to keep 
the drives cool during the imaging process.
203
 The FRED also has a write-protected 
imaging bay. Finally, according to the manufacturer’s website, the FRED can “acquire 
data directly from IDE/EIDE/ATA/SATA/ATAPI/SAS/Firewire/USB hard drives and 
storage devices and save forensic images to Blu-Ray, DVD, CD or hard drives.”204 FRED 
systems also acquire data from Blu-Ray, CD-ROM, DVD-ROM, Compact Flash, Micro 
Drives, Smart Media, Memory Stick, Memory Stick Pro, xD Cards, Secure Digital Media 
and Multimedia Cards.
205
 
 Kirshenbaum writes that, in order to ensure the integrity of the data after ingest, 
institutions must follow good archival practice, and use available tools and technology to 
ensure that the data is not “interfered with or altered” while in the custody of the 
repository.
206
 The archivist should also strive to be active in each stage of the archival life 
cycle for the digital records.
207
 He stresses the importance of maintaining metadata, 
which can be used to manage “both the use and administration of digital records.”208  
Jones and Valli discuss common mistakes in forensics investigations, and 
although they write in the context of a legal investigation, much of this discussion is also 
applicable to a cultural heritage institution. For example, one of the most common 
mistakes, they say, is the “failure to maintain the proper documentation.”209 Also, 
examiners may accidentally alter the data by opening a file.
210
 Examiners may also fail to 
“adequately control access to the digital evidence” and thus they will jeopardize the chain 
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of custody.
211
 Finally, the investigator might fail to realize or to admit when he had 
reached the limits of his own knowledge, and might not ask for help.
212
 Although Jones 
and Valli are writing about forensic investigators, this statement could also be applied to 
a staff member at a cultural heritage institution. As they say, “the subject is now so vast 
and complex it is not possible for one person to have the necessary level of knowledge in 
all relevant areas.”213  
Methodology and Results 
 In this experiment, I sought to answer the question: how long would it take to 
complete a certain digital forensic task, with a certain set of options within that task, on a 
piece of digital media of a certain size? To determine this, I performed a series of 
different forensics tasks that might be performed by a collecting institution. Often I did 
similar tasks with slight variations. For example, I made a disk image in a raw disk image 
format, and then imaged the same disk, but using E01 format. I did this in order to 
provide insight into how long each task takes, and then what within those tasks is the 
most time-consuming. I hope that, by performing similar tasks with slight variations, it 
allows others to see what activities and tasks are most time consuming. This, in turn, will 
hopefully allow others to perform a cost-benefit analysis of whether the time required for 
a certain task or certain variation will be worthwhile.  For most tasks, the software itself 
timed the task and provided information about how long it took to perform each task. 
When that was not available, I used a stopwatch function on my iPhone. 
 I recorded only the time it took for the computer to perform the task itself. I did 
not record the time for any of the activities leading up to the task, or activities I did in 
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preparation for another task. For example, I did not record the time it took to start a 
program or start up the computer.  
 To complete all of the following tasks, I used a FRED system.  The computer I 
used for these tasks was running on Windows 7 Ultimate with 24 GB of memory.  It had 
a 64 bit operating system. The main C drive of the FRED had a speed of 10,000 RPM. It 
had a NTFS file system.  I used a write-blocked USB connection to move data from the 
hard drive to the computer. I used an external floppy disk drive for the floppy disks, 
which I connected to the computer via a write-blocked USB connection .  
 For the first set of tasks, I used a 3.5 inch floppy disk, which contained 
approximately 1.5 MB of data. This disk was part of a collection of disks, which in turn 
was part of a collection in the UNC Southern Historical Collection. I was granted 
permission to use this disk by Meg Tuomala, the Electronic Records Archivist at the 
University of North Carolina, and I am extremely grateful that she gave me the 
opportunity to use these materials.  I used the same disk for all of the following 
experiments, to control for variations in different disks.  
 The first disk was labeled “Ques2.Dat to Ques231.dat.” It is assumed that this 
label was created by the producer. The disk contained 32 DAT files, a file format for 
data. The disk also contained two deleted, or unallocated, files of unknown size. The file 
system was FAT 12. There were no files on the disk larger than 1 MB. Files ranged in 
size from 24576 bytes to 51100 bytes.  There were no image files on the disk. The files 
on the disk were all last modified in January of 1995.  
 I first created a disk image using Guymager, which is a disk imaging tool that is 
part of the BitCurator environment. Guymager allows the user to choose from several 
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options when imaging a disk. First, the user can choose whether to create a raw disk 
image or an image in the .e01 format. The user can also choose to create an MD5 hash for 
the disk, a SHA-1 hash, a SHA-256 hash, two of these, all three, or none. The user can 
also choose to have the program re-read the source after acquisition and/or to verify the 
image after acquisition. Verifying the image after acquisition means that the program will 
use the generated hash to ensure that the acquired image has not been altered during 
acquisition. In re-reading the source after acquisition, the program will re-scan the source 
media to ensure that the disk image matches the source. Using the 1.5 MB floppy disk, I 
imaged the disk using some, all, or none of these options, and the time taken for each 
variation is recorded below. I also assigned a number to each image, for later use, as seen 
in Table 1.  
 For all tables, the time is recorded as hours, minutes, seconds unless otherwise 
noted. 
Table 1: Results of creating disk image in Guymager for Floppy Disk 1 
Image 
format 
MD5 SHA-1 SHA-
256 
Re-read 
source 
Verify 
image 
Time Image 
number 
Raw No No No No No 00:00:33 1 
E01 No No No No No 00:00:32  2 
Raw Yes No No No No 00:00:33  3 
E01 Yes No No No No 00:00:32 4 
Raw No Yes No No No 00:00:32 5 
E01 No Yes No No No 00:00:31 6 
Raw No No Yes No No 00:00:32 7 
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E01 No No Yes No No 00:00:33 8 
Raw Yes No No Yes No 00:01:02 9 
E01 Yes No No Yes No 00:01:03 10 
Raw Yes No No No Yes 00:00:32 11 
E01 Yes No No  No Yes 00:00:31 12 
Raw Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:01:00 13 
 
E01 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:01:02 14 
E01 Yes Yes No No  No 00:00:30 15 
E01 Yes Yes Yes No No 00:00:30 16 
E01 Yes No Yes No No 00:00:30 17 
E01 No Yes No Yes No 00:01:00 18 
E01 Yes Yes No Yes No 00:01:00 19 
E01 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 00:01:00 20 
E01 No No Yes Yes No 00:01:00 21 
E01 No Yes No No Yes 00:00:31 22 
E01 No No Yes No Yes 00:00:31 23 
 
The type of image (raw or E01) and the creation of the various hashes had little 
effect on the time needed to complete the task. The only option that had a significant 
effect on the time was re-reading the source after acquisition. This took about twice as 
long, whether or not I chose to add other options, such as MD5 hash. In order to select 
the option to re-read the source after acquisition, the user must also select at least one of 
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the hash options. The user is not able to select only “Re-read source after acquisition.” 
Interestingly, although the dialog box in Guymager tells the user that verifying the image 
after acquisition will take twice as long, the results do not support this.  
Table 2: Creating BitCurator reports from Disk Image 14 of Floppy Disk 1 
Bulk extractor, with default options 00:00:07 
Run All 00:00:04 
Fiwalk 00:00:06 
Annotate File Names 00:00:02 
BitCurator reports 00:00:03 
Bulk extractor, with default options and 
word list scanner 
00:00:04 
 
Bulk extractor, with just email scanner 00:00:01 
 
 Next, I created BitCurator reports, using several different variations. I used Image 
14 from the above task to create these reports.  
 I first had to run the image through bulk extractor. I used the default options, with 
the default scanners. As discussed previously, bulk extractor scans a disk image and 
extracts information from it without parsing the file system. It is important to run bulk 
extractor first before attempting to create other reports because the other reports use the 
output from bulk extractor. I used the default options, with the default scanners.
214
 I then 
used the “Run All” option to create the reports. Using the run all tab means that the 
program creates the fiwalk report, the annotate fie names reports, and the BitCurator 
reports.
 215
 
                                               
214 For a full list of the scanners and their functions, please see: 
http://wiki.bitcurator.net/index.php?title=Bulk_Extractor_Scanners 
215 BitCurator Wiki, “Using the Run All Tab” 
http://wiki.bitcurator.net/index.php?title=Using_the_Run_All_Tab. Accessed March 2014. 
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 I created a report using just fiwalk. Fiwalk, as discussed previously, is “a program 
that processes a disk image using the SleuthKit library and outputs its results in Digital 
Forensics XML.”216 
 I used the annotate file names option. This step matches the features found by 
bulk extractor to the file they are in on the disk image. This is necessary since bulk 
extractor ignores the file system and instead just scans the raw bit stream.
217
  
 I then ran the BitCurator reports. The BitCurator report combines the outputs of 
bulk extractor, fiwalk and the annotation tool to “generate both machine and human 
readable reports that can be read directly or crosswalked to other archival tools.” 218 
 I ran the image through bulk extractor again, this time using the default scanners, 
plus an addition scanner, word list, which creates a list of all the words found on the 
disk.
219
 
 I ran the image through bulk extractor again, this time using just one scanner, the 
email scanner, which “discovers RFC822 email headers, HTTP cookies, hostnames, IP 
addresses, email addresses, and URLs” and is “useful for recreating email 
correspondence on a device.”220 
 I then loaded the image into a case in FTK. Again, FTK allows for several 
different options when loading in a case. For example, the user can chose to use MD5 
                                               
216 Forensics Wiki, “Fiwalk.” http://www.forensicswiki.org/wiki/Fiwalk. Accessed March 2014. 
217 BitCurator Wiki, “Generating An Annotated Features Report.” 
http://wiki.bitcurator.net/index.php?title=Generating_an_Annotated_Features_Report. Accessed March 
2014. 
218 BitCurator Wiki, “Generating BitCurator Forensic Reports.” 
http://wiki.bitcurator.net/index.php?title=Generating_BitCurator_Forensic_Reports. Accessed March 2014. 
219 Bit Curator Wiki, “Bulk Extractor Scanners.” 
http://wiki.bitcurator.net/index.php?title=Bulk_Extractor_Scanners Accessed March 2014. 
220 Bit Curator Wiki, “Bulk Extractor Scanners.”  
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hash, SHA-1 Hash, SHA-256 hash, or all three, or none, or two. The user can choose 
(among other options) whether or not to: 
 Flag duplicate files 
 Run file signature analysis, which “analyzes files to indicate whether their 
headers or signatures match their extensions.”221 
 Flag bad extensions, which “identifies files whose types do not match their 
extensions, based on the file header information”222 
 Generate a dtSearch Text Index. Doing so will allow you to an index search of 
acquired images.
223
 An index search will allow you to search for discrete words 
or number strings in the allocated and unallocated space on a disk image.
224
 
Dtsearch is “one of the leading search tools available” and “can quickly search 
gigabtyes of text.”225 
 Create thumbnails for graphics 
 Optical Character Recognition (OCR) on the files. OCR “scans graphics files for 
text and converts graphics-text into actual text. That text can then be indexed, 
searched and treated as any other text in the case.”226 Note that OCR is only used 
for graphics files. 
I loaded the disk image into FTK while selecting and de-selecting these options, 
in several different combinations. I again used Disk Image 14 which was taken from 
Floppy Disk 1. The results of these tasks can be seen in Table 3 below. 
                                               
221 AccessData, “Forensic ToolKit: User Guide” 
http://cse.spsu.edu/raustin2/coursefiles/forensics/FTK_UG_3-4-1.pdf. Accessed March 2014. 
222 AccessData.  
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Table 3: Adding Disk Image 14 to a case in FTK 
MD5 SHA-
1 
SHA-
256 
Flag  
Duplicate 
Files 
File 
Signature 
Analysis 
Flag 
Bad 
Ext. 
dtSearch 
Text 
Index 
Create 
Thumbnails 
for graphics 
OCR Time 
No No No No No No No No No 00:00:26 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:00:39 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 00:00:27 
No No No No No No No No Yes 00:00:29 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes 00:00:29 
No No No No No No No Yes No 00:00:27 
No No No No Yes Yes No No No 00:00:27 
Yes No No Yes No No No No No 00:00:26 
No No No No Yes No Yes No No 00:00:38 
 
When the user selects to check for bad file extensions or to use the dtSearch text index, 
the program automatically selects the option for file signature analysis, and the user 
cannot un-select it. The two must be performed together. Also, when the user selects to 
flag duplicates, the user must also select to use the MD5 hash option. This is because 
creating a hash is what allows the system to flag the duplicates.   
 The second disk was a 3.5 inch floppy disk with 1.5 MB of data. It came from the 
same collection as the first and was labelled “Modferty + Famferty.”  It is assumed that 
this label was created by the producer. The second disk contained 47 files in all and 1.5 
MB of data. The disk contained 23 DOC files. The rest of the files had the file extension 
.FIG and appeared to be figures. The disk contained 4 directories and one deleted file. 
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There were no files on the disk bigger than 1 MB. The disk also contained document files 
and data files. The files ranged in size from 6656 bytes to 49,152 bytes. The documents 
were all last modified between 1992 and 1997. The disk also used the FAT 12 file 
system. 
 I again created a disk image of the floppy disk in Guymager, selecting and de-
selecting the many options previously discussed, in a variety of combinations. The time 
needed to complete these tasks can be seen in Table 4. 
Table 4: Results of creating disk image in Guymager for Floppy Disk 2 
Image 
format 
MD5 SHA-1 SHA-
256 
Re-read 
source 
Verify 
image 
Time Image 
number 
Raw No No No No No 00:00:30 24 
E01 No No No No No 00:00:31  25 
Raw Yes No No No No 00:00:29  26 
E01 Yes No No No No 00:00:30 27 
Raw No Yes No No No 00:00:30 28 
E01 No Yes No No No 00:00:30 29 
Raw No No Yes No No 00:00:29 30 
E01 No No Yes No No 00:00:31 31 
Raw Yes No No Yes No 00:01:00 32 
E01 Yes No No Yes No 00:01:01 33 
Raw Yes No No No Yes 00:00:30 34 
E01 Yes No No  No Yes 00:00:30 35 
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Raw Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:01:00 36 
 
E01 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:01:00 37 
E01 Yes Yes No No  No 00:00:30 38 
E01 Yes Yes Yes No No 00:00:30 39 
E01 Yes No Yes No No 00:00:30 40 
E01 No Yes No Yes No 00:01:00 41 
E01 Yes Yes No Yes No 00:01:00 42 
E01 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 00:01:00 43 
E01 No No Yes Yes No 00:01:01 44 
E01 No Yes No No Yes 00:00:30 45 
E01 No No Yes No Yes 00:00:30 46 
 
As with the first floppy disk, I then generated reports using BitCurator, and the 
time needed to complete these tasks can be seen in Table 5. 
Table 5: Creating BitCurator reports from Disk Image 37 of Floppy Disk 2 
Bulk extractor, with default options 00:00:03 
Run All 00:00:06 
Fiwalk 00:00:02 
Annotate File Names 00:00:02 
BitCurator reports 00:00:02 
Bulk extractor, with default options and 
word list scanner 
00:00:03 
 
Bulk extractor, with just email scanner 00:00:02 
 
I then loaded Disk Image 37 as evidence into a case in FTK, using a variety of 
available options, as with the previous floppy disk, and the results can be seen in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Adding Disk Image 37 to a case in FTK 
MD5 SHA-1 SHA-
256 
Flag  
Duplicate 
Files 
File 
Signature 
Analysis 
Flag 
Bad 
Ext. 
dtSearch 
Text 
Index 
Create 
Thumbnails 
for graphics 
OCR Time 
No No No No No No No No No 00:00:29 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:00:34 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 00:00:31 
No No No No No No No No Yes 00:00:25 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes 00:00:30 
No No No No No No No Yes No 00:00:29 
No No No No Yes Yes No No No 00:00:30 
Yes No No Yes No No No No No 00:00:29 
No No No No Yes No Yes No No 00:00:33 
 
 The third disk was a 3.5 inch floppy disk with 1.5 MB of data. It was labelled and 
came from the same collection as the previous ones and was labeled “Programs for 
Demographic Analysis with Compliments of: Population Research Laboratory, The 
University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6G 2H4.” It is assumed that this 
label was created by the producer. It contained approximately 1.5 MB of data. It 
contained a variety of file formats and sizes. It also included one deleted file. It did not 
include any files larger than 1 MB. The disk used the FAT 12 file system. The disk 
contained 38 data files, 12 files in the lotus 1-2-3 wk1 document data format, 2 Corel 
WordPerfect files, 4 SysEx files, 2 DOS floppy hard disk boot sector files, 32 MS-DOS 
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executable files, 4 files of ASCII English text and 4 empty files. The files ranged in size 
from 158 bytes to 58928 bytes. The files were all last modified in 1993.  
 I created a disk image of the third floppy disk using Guymager, and the results 
can be seen in Table 7. 
Table 7: Results of creating disk image in Guymager for Floppy Disk 3 
Image 
format 
MD5 SHA-1 SHA-
256 
Re-read 
source 
Verify 
image 
Time Image 
number 
Raw No No No No No 00:00:30 47 
E01 No No No No No 00:00:31  48 
Raw Yes No No No No 00:00:31  49 
E01 Yes No No No No 00:00:31 50 
Raw No Yes No No No 00:00:30 51 
E01 No Yes No No No 00:00:31 52 
Raw No No Yes No No 00:00:30 53 
E01 No No Yes No No 00:00:30 54 
Raw Yes No No Yes No 00:01:00 55 
E01 Yes No No Yes No 00:00:59 56 
Raw Yes No No No Yes 00:00:30 57 
E01 Yes No No  No Yes 00:00:30 58 
Raw Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:01:01 59 
 
E01 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:01:00 60 
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E01 Yes Yes No No  No 00:00:32 61 
E01 Yes Yes Yes No No 00:00:30 62 
E01 Yes No Yes No No 00:00:31 63 
E01 No Yes No Yes No 00:01:01 64 
E01 Yes Yes No Yes No 00:01:01 65 
E01 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 00:01:00 66 
E01 No No Yes Yes No 00:01:01 67 
E01 No Yes No No Yes 00:00:31 68 
E01 No No Yes No Yes 00:00:30 69 
 
 I also generated reports of Disk Image 60 using the BitCurator environment. The 
time needed to complete these tasks can be seen in Table 8. 
Table 8: Creating BitCurator reports from Disk Image 60 of Floppy Disk 3  
Bulk extractor, with default options 00:00:02 
Run All 00:00:02 
Fiwalk 00:00:01 
Annotate File Names 00:00:01 
BitCurator reports 00:00:01 
Bulk extractor, with default options and 
word list scanner 
00:00:02 
 
Bulk extractor, with just email scanner 00:00:01 
 
I also loaded Disk Image 60 as an evidence item in a case in FTK, using a variety of 
options. The time needed to complete these tasks can be seen in Table 9. 
Table 9: Adding Disk Image 60 to a case in FTK 
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MD5 SHA-1 SHA-
256 
Flag  
Duplicate 
Files 
File 
Signature 
Analysis 
Flag 
Bad 
Ext. 
dtSearch 
Text 
Index 
Create 
Thumbnails 
for graphics 
OCR Time 
No No No No No No No No No 00:00:32 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:00:37 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 00:00:39 
No No No No No No No No Yes 00:00:27 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes 00:00:34 
No No No No No No No Yes No 00:00:33 
No No No No Yes Yes No No No 00:00:33 
Yes No No Yes No No No No No 00:00:35 
No No No No Yes No Yes No No 00:00:36 
 
 The fourth disk was a 3.5-inch floppy disk with approximately 1.5 MB of data. It 
was labelled “Gateway 2000 Mach 64 Drivers and Utilities, Disk 2 of 3, Version 1.43, 
12/5/94.” This disk was also part of the same collection as the previous one. The disk 
contained five files with the LZH extension (LZH compressed), one Exe file, two HLP 
files (help files), one SYS file, one SCR file, one NT file, one INF file, and on DLL file. 
The files ranged in size from 997 bytes (a LZH file) to 195142 bytes (also an LZH file). 
There was one partition that contained a deleted or unallocated file. The disk used the 
FAT 12 file system, and the files were last modified in 1994. 
I created a disk image of the fourth floppy disk using Guymager, and the results 
can be seen in Table 10. 
Table 10: Results of creating disk image in Guymager for Floppy Disk 4 
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Image 
format 
MD5 SHA-1 SHA-
256 
Re-read 
source 
Verify 
image 
Time Image 
number 
Raw No No No No No 00:00:29 70 
E01 No No No No No 00:00:32  71 
Raw Yes No No No No 00:00:30  72 
E01 Yes No No No No 00:00:30 73 
Raw No Yes No No No 00:00:31 74 
E01 No Yes No No No 00:00:31 75 
Raw No No Yes No No 00:00:31 76 
E01 No No Yes No No 00:00:31 77 
Raw Yes No No Yes No 00:00:59 78 
E01 Yes No No Yes No 00:01:01 79 
Raw Yes No No No Yes 00:00:30 80 
E01 Yes No No  No Yes 00:00:30 81 
Raw Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:00:59 82 
 
E01 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:01:00 83 
E01 Yes Yes No No  No 00:00:31 84 
E01 Yes Yes Yes No No 00:00:30 85 
E01 Yes No Yes No No 00:00:30 86 
E01 No Yes No Yes No 00:01:00 87 
E01 Yes Yes No Yes No 00:01:00 88 
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E01 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 00:01:00 89 
E01 No No Yes Yes No 00:01:01 90 
E01 No Yes No No Yes 00:00:31 91 
E01 No No Yes No Yes 00:00:30 92 
 
 I also generated reports of Disk Image 83 using the BitCurator environment. The 
time needed to complete these tasks can be seen in Table 11 
Table 11: Creating BitCurator Reports from Disk Image 83 of Floppy Disk 4  
Bulk extractor, with default options 00:00:01 
Run All 00:00:03 
Fiwalk 00:00:01 
Annotate File Names 00:00:01 
BitCurator reports 00:00:02 
Bulk extractor, with default options and 
word list scanner 
00:00:02 
 
Bulk extractor, with just email scanner 00:00:01 
 
I also loaded Disk Image 83 as an evidence item in a case in FTK, using a variety of 
options. The time needed to complete these tasks can be seen in Table 12. 
Table 12: Adding Disk Image 83 to a case in FTK 
MD5 SHA-1 SHA-
256 
Flag  
Duplicate 
Files 
File 
Signature 
Analysis 
Flag 
Bad 
Ext. 
dtSearch 
Text 
Index 
Create 
Thumbnails 
for graphics 
OCR Time 
No No No No No No No No No 00:00:29 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:00:33 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 00:00:29 
No No No No No No No No Yes 00:00:27 
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Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes 00:00:30 
No No No No No No No Yes No 00:00:28 
No No No No Yes Yes No No No 00:00:30 
Yes No No Yes No No No No No 00:00:29 
No No No No Yes No Yes No No 00:00:33 
 
 The fifth disk was not part of the same collection as the previous disks and was 
instead part of a collection of disk used by the digital forensics lab at the University of 
North Carolina School of Information and Library Science. I used this disk to create 
variety in my sample. It was a 3.5 inch floppy disk and contained 737.3 KB of data. It 
was labelled “Harry S. Truman Library, oral histories.” The disk contained 18 Corel 
Word Perfect files, four files of data, tow DOS_tor DOS floppy hard disk booter files and 
two deleted files.  The files ranged in size from 56,279 bytes to 117,428 bytes. The files 
were last modified in 1994 and used the FAT 12 file system.   
 I created a disk image of this floppy disk using Guymager and the many options 
allowed by Guymager. The results of these tasks can be seen in Table 13. 
Table 13: Results of creating disk image in Guymager for Floppy Disk 5 
Image 
format 
MD5 SHA-1 SHA-
256 
Re-read 
source 
Verify 
image 
Time Image 
number 
Raw No No No No No 00:00:28 93 
E01 No No No No No 00:00:28  94 
Raw Yes No No No No 00:00:28  95 
E01 Yes No No No No 00:00:29 96 
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Raw No Yes No No No 00:00:28 97 
E01 No Yes No No No 00:00:28 98 
Raw No No Yes No No 00:00:28 99 
E01 No No Yes No No 00:00:29 100 
Raw Yes No No Yes No 00:00:56 101 
E01 Yes No No Yes No 00:00:56 102 
Raw Yes No No No Yes 00:00:28 103 
E01 Yes No No  No Yes 00:00:28 104 
Raw Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:00:55 105 
 
E01 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:00:56 106 
E01 Yes Yes No No  No 00:00:29 107 
E01 Yes Yes Yes No No 00:00:28 108 
E01 Yes No Yes No No 00:00:28 109 
E01 No Yes No Yes No 00:00:56 110 
E01 Yes Yes No Yes No 00:00:57 111 
E01 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 00:00:57 112 
E01 No No Yes Yes No 00:00:56 113 
E01 No Yes No No Yes 00:00:28 114 
E01 No No Yes No Yes 00:00:27 115 
 
 I also generated reports of Disk Image 106 using BitCurator. The time needed to 
complete these tasks can be seen in Table 14. 
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Table 14: Creating BitCurator Reports from Disk Image 106 of Floppy Disk 5 
Bulk extractor, with default options 00:00:01 
Run All 00:00:02 
Fiwalk 00:00:01 
Annotate File Names 00:00:01 
BitCurator reports 00:00:02 
Bulk extractor, with default options and 
word list scanner 
00:00:02 
 
Bulk extractor, with just email scanner 00:00:01 
 
I also loaded Disk Image 106 as an evidence item in a case in FTK, using a variety of 
options. The time needed to complete these tasks can be seen in Table 15. 
Table 15: Adding Disk Image 106 to a case in FTK 
MD5 SHA-1 SHA-
256 
Flag  
Duplicate 
Files 
File 
Signature 
Analysis 
Flag 
Bad 
Ext. 
dtSearch 
Text 
Index 
Create 
Thumbnails 
for graphics 
OCR Time 
No No No No No No No No No 00:00:29 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:00:34 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 00:00:29 
No No No No No No No No Yes 00:00:29 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes 00:00:29 
No No No No No No No Yes No 00:00:29 
No No No No Yes Yes No No No 00:00:29 
Yes No No Yes No No No No No 00:00:29 
No No No No Yes No Yes No No 00:00:33 
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 The sixth disk was also part of the materials available for use in the digital 
forensics laboratory at the University of North Carolina School of Information and 
Library Science. The floppy disk was labelled “Stever Papers Finding Aid. 
STEVER.PAP. Ford Library.” It is assumed that the label was created by the producer of 
the item.  The floppy disk contained 737.3 KB of data. The disk contained 15 allocated 
files and 15 deleted files. It used the FAT 12 file system and contained no files larger 
than 1 MB. The largest file on the disk was called STEVER.PAP and contained 180331 
bytes. The smallest file on the disk was called CTOOLS.BAT and contained 51 bytes. 
The files were mostly last modified in 1991, with one file being last modified in 1994. 
The deleted files included EXE file formats, as walls as .BAT, .CFG, .TXT, .COM, and 
.OVL.  
 I created a disk image for this floppy disk using Guymager, selecting and 
deselecting the various options. The time needed to complete these tasks can be seen in 
Table 16. 
 Table 16: Results of creating disk image in Guymager for Floppy Disk 6 
Image 
format 
MD5 SHA-1 SHA-
256 
Re-read 
source 
Verify 
image 
Time Image 
number 
Raw No No No No No 00:00:28 116 
E01 No No No No No 00:00:29  117 
Raw Yes No No No No 00:00:27  118 
E01 Yes No No No No 00:00:28 119 
Raw No Yes No No No 00:00:28 120 
E01 No Yes No No No 00:00:29 121 
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Raw No No Yes No No 00:00:28 122 
E01 No No Yes No No 00:00:28 123 
Raw Yes No No Yes No 00:00:56 124 
E01 Yes No No Yes No 00:00:57 125 
Raw Yes No No No Yes 00:00:56 126 
E01 Yes No No  No Yes 00:00:29 127 
Raw Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:00:54 128 
 
E01 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:00:56 129 
E01 Yes Yes No No  No 00:00:28 130 
E01 Yes Yes Yes No No 00:00:28 131 
E01 Yes No Yes No No 00:00:28 132 
E01 No Yes No Yes No 00:00:56 133 
E01 Yes Yes No Yes No 00:00:57 134 
E01 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 00:00:55 135 
E01 No No Yes Yes No 00:00:56 136 
E01 No Yes No No Yes 00:00:29 137 
E01 No No Yes No Yes 00:00:28 138 
 
 I also generated reports of Disk Image 129 using BitCurator. The time needed to 
complete these tasks can be seen in Table 17. 
Table 17: Creating BitCurator Reports from Disk Image 129 of Floppy Disk 6 
Bulk extractor, with default options 00:00:01 
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Run All 00:00:03 
Fiwalk 00:00:01 
Annotate File Names 00:00:01 
BitCurator reports 00:00:02 
Bulk extractor, with default options and 
word list scanner 
00:00:02 
 
Bulk extractor, with just email scanner 00:00:01 
 
I also loaded Disk Image 129 as an evidence item in a case in FTK, using a variety of 
options. The time needed to complete these tasks can be seen in Table 18. 
Table 18: Adding Disk Image 129 to a case in FTK 
MD5 SHA-1 SHA-
256 
Flag  
Duplicate 
Files 
File 
Signature 
Analysis 
Flag 
Bad 
Ext. 
dtSearch 
Text 
Index 
Create 
Thumbnails 
for graphics 
OCR Time 
No No No No No No No No No 00:00:29 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:00:33 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 00:00:31 
No No No No No No No No Yes 00:00:24 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes 00:00:30 
No No No No No No No Yes No 00:00:30 
No No No No Yes Yes No No No 00:00:30 
Yes No No Yes No No No No No 00:00:29 
No No No No Yes No Yes No No 00:00:32 
 
 The seventh disk was labeled “Program for 1993 Survey” and contained 1.5 MB 
of data. This disk came from the same collection as Disks 1-4 and was part of a collection 
from the Southern Historical Collection at the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
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Hill.  It contained four PRG files, one DAT file, three PGM files, and one DAT file. The 
files ranged in size from 322 bytes to about 480,422 bytes. 
 Table 19: Results of creating disk image in Guymager for Floppy Disk 7 
Image 
format 
MD5 SHA-1 SHA-
256 
Re-read 
source 
Verify 
image 
Time Image 
number 
Raw No No No No No 00:00:30 139 
E01 No No No No No 00:00:31  140 
Raw Yes No No No No 00:00:31  141 
E01 Yes No No No No 00:00:31 142 
Raw No Yes No No No 00:00:30 143 
E01 No Yes No No No 00:00:31 144 
Raw No No Yes No No 00:00:31 145 
E01 No No Yes No No 00:00:30 146 
Raw Yes No No Yes No 00:01:00 147 
E01 Yes No No Yes No 00:01:00 148 
Raw Yes No No No Yes 00:00:30 149 
E01 Yes No No  No Yes 00:00:30 150 
Raw Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:01:01 151 
 
E01 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:01:00 152 
E01 Yes Yes No No  No 00:00:30 153 
E01 Yes Yes Yes No No 00:00:31 154 
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E01 Yes No Yes No No 00:00:31 155 
E01 No Yes No Yes No 00:01:00 156 
E01 Yes Yes No Yes No 00:01:00 157 
E01 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 00:01:01 158 
E01 No No Yes Yes No 00:01:00 159 
E01 No Yes No No Yes 00:00:30 160 
E01 No No Yes No Yes 00:00:30 161 
 
 I also generated reports of Disk Image 152 using BitCurator. The time needed to 
complete these tasks can be seen in Table 20. 
Table 20: Creating BitCurator reports from Disk Image 154 of Floppy Disk 7 
Bulk extractor, with default options 00:00:01 
Run All 00:00:03 
Fiwalk 00:00:02 
Annotate File Names 00:00:02 
BitCurator reports 00:00:02 
Bulk extractor, with default options and 
word list scanner 
00:00:01 
 
Bulk extractor, with just email scanner 00:00:01 
 
I also loaded Disk Image 152 as an evidence item in a case in FTK, using a 
variety of options. The time needed to complete these tasks can be seen in Table 21. 
Table 21: Adding Disk Image 152 to a case in FTK 
MD5 SHA-1 SHA-
256 
Flag  
Duplicate 
Files 
File 
Signature 
Analysis 
Flag 
Bad 
Ext. 
dtSearch 
Text 
Index 
Create 
Thumbnails 
for graphics 
OCR Time 
No No No No No No No No No 00:00:30 
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Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:00:34 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 00:00:29 
No No No No No No No No Yes 00:00:23 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes 00:00:29 
No No No No No No No Yes No 00:00:30 
No No No No Yes Yes No No No 00:00:29 
Yes No No Yes No No No No No 00:00:30 
No No No No Yes No Yes No No 00:00:33 
 
 The eighth disk was labeled simply “1” and contained approximately 1.5 MB of 
data. It came from the same collection as the previous disk. It contained only two files, 
both with the extension .001. One file contained 1,456,128 bytes and the other contained 
1,271 bytes. 
Table 22: Results of creating disk image in Guymager for Floppy Disk 8 
Image 
format 
MD5 SHA-1 SHA-
256 
Re-read 
source 
Verify 
image 
Time Image 
number 
Raw No No No No No 00:00:30 162 
E01 No No No No No 00:00:30  163 
Raw Yes No No No No 00:00:31  164 
E01 Yes No No No No 00:00:29 165 
Raw No Yes No No No 00:00:31 166 
E01 No Yes No No No 00:00:30 167 
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Raw No No Yes No No 00:00:31 168 
E01 No No Yes No No 00:00:29 169 
Raw Yes No No Yes No 00:01:00 170 
E01 Yes No No Yes No 00:00:59 171 
Raw Yes No No No Yes 00:00:31 172 
E01 Yes No No  No Yes 00:00:31 173 
Raw Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:01:00 174 
E01 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:01:00 175 
E01 Yes Yes No No  No 00:00:31 176 
E01 Yes Yes Yes No No 00:00:30 177 
E01 Yes No Yes No No 00:00:31 178 
E01 No Yes No Yes No 00:01:01 179 
E01 Yes Yes No Yes No 00:01:00 180 
E01 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 00:01:00 181 
E01 No No Yes Yes No 00:01:01 182 
E01 No Yes No No Yes 00:00:31 183 
E01 No No Yes No Yes 00:00:31 184 
 
 I also generated reports of Disk Image 175 using BitCurator. The time needed to 
complete these tasks can be seen in Table 23. 
Table 23: Creating BitCurator reports from Disk Image 175 of Floppy Disk 8 
Bulk extractor, with default options 00:00:01 
Run All 00:00:03 
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Fiwalk 00:00:02 
Annotate File Names 00:00:02 
BitCurator reports 00:00:02 
Bulk extractor, with default options and 
word list scanner 
00:00:02 
 
Bulk extractor, with just email scanner 00:00:01 
 
I loaded Disk Image 175 as an evidence item in a case in FTK, using a variety of 
options. The time needed to complete these tasks can be seen in Table 24. 
Table 24: Adding Disk Image 175 to a case in FTK 
MD5 SHA-1 SHA-
256 
Flag  
Duplicate 
Files 
File 
Signature 
Analysis 
Flag 
Bad 
Ext. 
dtSearch 
Text 
Index 
Create 
Thumbnails 
for graphics 
OCR Time 
No No No No No No No No No 00:00:30 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:00:34 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 00:00:29 
No No No No No No No No Yes 00:00:23 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes 00:00:29 
No No No No No No No Yes No 00:00:29 
No No No No Yes Yes No No No 00:00:30 
Yes No No Yes No No No No No 00:00:30 
No No No No Yes No Yes No No 00:00:34 
 
 
 The ninth disk was not labeled and was part of the same collection as the previous 
disk. It contained eight files with the extension SYS, four SSD files, two EXE files, and a 
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variety of other file formats, including LQ, NLQ, BAK, HLP, and CMD. The files ranged 
in size from 1,063,372 bytes to 1 byte. 
Table 25: Results of creating disk image in Guymager for Floppy Disk 9 
Image 
format 
MD5 SHA-1 SHA-
256 
Re-read 
source 
Verify 
image 
Time Image 
number 
Raw No No No No No 00:00:31 185 
E01 No No No No No 00:00:30  186 
Raw Yes No No No No 00:00:30  187 
E01 Yes No No No No 00:00:30 188 
Raw No Yes No No No 00:00:30 189 
E01 No Yes No No No 00:00:31 190 
Raw No No Yes No No 00:00:30 191 
E01 No No Yes No No 00:00:30 192 
Raw Yes No No Yes No 00:01:01 193 
E01 Yes No No Yes No 00:01:00 194 
Raw Yes No No No Yes 00:00:30 195 
E01 Yes No No  No Yes 00:00:30 196 
Raw Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:00:59 197 
 
E01 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:00:59 198 
E01 Yes Yes No No  No 00:00:30 199 
E01 Yes Yes Yes No No 00:00:31 200 
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E01 Yes No Yes No No 00:00:31 201 
E01 No Yes No Yes No 00:01:00 202 
E01 Yes Yes No Yes No 00:01:00 203 
E01 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 00:01:00 204 
E01 No No Yes Yes No 00:01:00 205 
E01 No Yes No No Yes 00:00:31 206 
E01 No No Yes No Yes 00:00:31 207 
 
 I also generated reports of Disk Image 198 using the BitCurator environment. The 
time needed to complete these tasks can be seen in Table 26. 
Table 26: Creating BitCurator reports from Disk Image 198 from Floppy Disk 9 
Bulk extractor, with default options 00:00:01 
Run All 00:00:03 
Fiwalk 00:00:02 
Annotate File Names 00:00:01 
BitCurator reports 00:00:02 
Bulk extractor, with default options and 
word list scanner 
00:00:01 
 
Bulk extractor, with just email scanner 00:00:01 
 
I also loaded Disk Image 198 as an evidence item in a case in FTK, using a variety of 
options. The time needed to complete these tasks can be seen in Table 27. 
Table 27: Adding Disk Image 198 to a case in FTK 
MD5 SHA-1 SHA-
256 
Flag  
Duplicate 
Files 
File 
Signature 
Analysis 
Flag 
Bad 
Ext. 
dtSearch 
Text 
Index 
Create 
Thumbnails 
for graphics 
OCR Time 
No No No No No No No No No 00:00:31 
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Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:00:33 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 00:00:30 
No No No No No No No No Yes 00:00:30 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes 00:00:30 
No No No No No No No Yes No 00:00:30 
No No No No Yes Yes No No No 00:00:30 
Yes No No Yes No No No No No 00:00:30 
No No No No Yes No Yes No No 00:00:35 
 
 
 The tenth disk was labeled ““Ques 137. DAT, 138, 138” and was part of the same 
collection as the previous disk. The file contained three large .DAT files which were each 
about 470,000 bytes in size.  
Table 28: Results of creating disk image in Guymager for Floppy Disk 10 
Image 
format 
MD5 SHA-1 SHA-
256 
Re-read 
source 
Verify 
image 
Time Image 
number 
Raw No No No No No 00:00:30 208 
E01 No No No No No 00:00:31  209 
Raw Yes No No No No 00:00:30  210 
E01 Yes No No No No 00:00:30 211 
Raw No Yes No No No 00:00:30 212 
E01 No Yes No No No 00:00:30 213 
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Raw No No Yes No No 00:00:31 214 
E01 No No Yes No No 00:00:32 215 
Raw Yes No No Yes No 00:01:01 216 
E01 Yes No No Yes No 00:01:01 217 
Raw Yes No No No Yes 00:00:30 218 
E01 Yes No No  No Yes 00:00:31 219 
Raw Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:01:00 220 
 
E01 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:01:00 221 
E01 Yes Yes No No  No 00:00:31 222 
E01 Yes Yes Yes No No 00:00:30 223 
E01 Yes No Yes No No 00:00:31 224 
E01 No Yes No Yes No 00:01:00 225 
E01 Yes Yes No Yes No 00:01:00 226 
E01 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 00:01:00 227 
E01 No No Yes Yes No 00:01:00 228 
E01 No Yes No No Yes 00:00:30 229 
E01 No No Yes No Yes 00:00:31 230 
 
 I generated reports of Disk Image 221 using the BitCurator environment. The 
time needed to complete these tasks can be seen in Table 29. 
Table 29: Creating BitCurator reports from Disk Image 221 of Floppy Disk 10 
Bulk extractor, with default options 00:00:02 
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Run All 00:00:03 
Fiwalk 00:00:01 
Annotate File Names 00:00:01 
BitCurator reports 00:00:02 
Bulk extractor, with default options and 
word list scanner 
00:00:02 
 
Bulk extractor, with just email scanner 00:00:01 
 
I also loaded Disk Image 221 as an evidence item in a case in FTK, using a variety of 
options. The time needed to complete these tasks can be seen in Table 30. 
Table 30: Adding Disk Image 221 to a case in FTK 
MD5 SHA-1 SHA-
256 
Flag  
Duplicate 
Files 
File 
Signature 
Analysis 
Flag 
Bad 
Ext. 
dtSearch 
Text 
Index 
Create 
Thumbnails 
for graphics 
OCR Time 
No No No No No No No No No 00:00:30 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:00:34 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 00:00:30 
No No No No No No No No Yes 00:00:30 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes 00:00:30 
No No No No No No No Yes No 00:00:30 
No No No No Yes Yes No No No 00:00:30 
Yes No No Yes No No No No No 00:00:30 
No No No No Yes No Yes No No 00:00:33 
 
 After completing these tasks using the floppy disk, I had intended to complete the 
same set of tasks using an external 2-terabyte hard drive, which also came from the 
Southern Historical Collection at the University of North Carolina.  This disk contained a 
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variety of file formats, including JPEG and TIFF image files, Microsoft Word 97 files, 
WordPerfect files, Adobe Acrobat files, HTML files, Access 2000 files, Excel 97 files, 
some unknown file types. It also contained unallocated space as well as slack space. 
There were 47,742 items on the disk. There were approximately 600 JPEG files on the 
disk, which were each around 100 KB. There were also approximately five hundred TIFF 
image files, which ranged in size from 4096 bytes to 134.1 MB. The drive also contained 
about two hundred Adobe Acrobat files, which ranged in size from about 98 KB to about 
4 MB. The large number of images on the hard drive, as well as these large Adobe 
Acrobat files, may help to explain why it took so long for the program to create a disk 
image of the drive.   
When I created a disk image of the hard drive, it took 97 hours, 22 minutes, and 
33 seconds. It was created as an E01 file with the default options for FTK Imager. By 
default, the program does not select other options, such as to verify the image after it is 
created, or to create a directory listing of all the files in the image after the image is 
created. As such, I did not have any of these options selected when I created this disk 
image.   After that, it became clear that I would not have time to complete the same series 
of tasks, and so I decided that I would not be able to do so many variations. 
 I also loaded the image as evidence for a case in FTK. I did not select any of the 
possible options for this task, such as created an MD5 hash. It took 40 minutes and 12 
seconds to complete this task.  
 In Table 31, I have compiled all the fastest times (that is, requiring the least 
amount of time) in which the different disk image tasks were completed. If multiple disk 
images required the same amount of time, I have included them both.  
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Table 31: Fastest Time For Disk Image Creation 
Image 
format 
MD5 SHA-1 SHA-
256 
Re-read 
source 
Verify 
image 
Time Image 
number(s) 
Raw No No No No No 00:00:28 93, 116 
E01 No No No No No 00:00:28 94 
Raw Yes No No No No 00:00:27  118 
E01 Yes No No No No 00:00:28 119 
Raw No Yes No No No 00:00:28 97, 120 
E01 No Yes No No No 00:00:28 98 
Raw No No Yes No No 00:00:28 99, 122 
E01 No No Yes No No 00:00:28 123 
Raw Yes No No Yes No 00:00:56 101, 124 
E01 Yes No No Yes No 00:00:56 102 
Raw Yes No No No Yes 00:00:28 103 
E01 Yes No No  No Yes 00:00:28 104, 127 
Raw Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:00:54 128 
 
E01 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:00:56 106, 129 
E01 Yes Yes No No  No 00:00:28 130 
E01 Yes Yes Yes No No 00:00:28 108, 131 
E01 Yes No Yes No No 00:00:28 109, 132 
E01 No Yes No Yes No 00:00:56 110, 133 
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E01 Yes Yes No Yes No 00:00:57 111. 134 
E01 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 00:00:55 135 
E01 No No Yes Yes No 00:00:56 113, 136 
E01 No Yes No No Yes 00:00:28 114 
E01 No No Yes No Yes 00:00:27 115 
 
 In table 32, I have listed all the slowest times for disk image completion (that is, 
the tasks that required the most time to complete).  
Table 32: Slowest Time for Disk Image Creation 
Image 
format 
MD5 SHA-1 SHA-
256 
Re-read 
source 
Verify 
image 
Time Image 
number(s) 
Raw No No No No No 00:00:33 1 
E01 No No No No No 00:00:32 2 
Raw Yes No No No No 00:00:33 3 
E01 Yes No No No No 00:00:32 4 
Raw No Yes No No No 00:00:32 5 
E01 No Yes No No No 00:00:31 6, 52, 75, 
144, 190 
Raw No No Yes No No 00:00:32 7 
E01 No No Yes No No 00:00:33 8 
Raw Yes No No Yes No 00:01:02 10 
E01 Yes No No Yes No 00:01:03 11 
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Raw Yes No No No Yes 00:00:32 12 
E01 Yes No No  No Yes 00:00:31 13, 173, 
219 
Raw Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:01:01 59, 151 
 
E01 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:01:02 15 
E01 Yes Yes No No  No 00:00:32 61 
E01 Yes Yes Yes No No 00:00:31 154, 200 
E01 Yes No Yes No No 00:00:31 63, 155, 
178, 201, 
224 
E01 No Yes No Yes No 00:01:01 64, 179 
E01 Yes Yes No Yes No 00:01:01 65 
E01 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 00:01:01 158 
E01 No No Yes Yes No 00:01:01 44, 67, 182 
E01 No Yes No No Yes 00:00:31 23, 68, 91, 
183, 206 
E01 No No Yes No Yes 00:00:31 23, 184, 
207, 230 
 
In Table 33,  I have indicated the fastest times in which reports were generated in 
the BitCurator environment, and from what image or images they were generated .  
Table 33: Fastest Time for Creating Reports in BitCurator 
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Task Time Image 
Number(s) 
Bulk extractor, with default options 00:00:01 83, 106, 129, 
152, 175, 198, 
Run All 00:00:02 60, 106 
Fiwalk 00:00:01 60, 83, 106, 129, 
221 
Annotate File Names 00:00:01 60, 83, 106, 129, 
198, 221 
BitCurator reports 00:00:01 60 
Bulk extractor, with default options and 
word list scanner 
00:00:01 
 
152, 198 
 
Bulk extractor, with just email scanner 00:00:01 15, 60, 83, 106, 
129, 152, 175, 
198, 221 
 
In Table 34,  I have indicated the slowest times in which reports were generated in 
the BitCurator environment, and from what image or images they were generated .  
Table 34: Slowest Time for Creating Report in BitCurator 
Task Time Image 
Number(s) 
Bulk extractor, with default options 00:00:07 15 
Run All 00:00:06 37 
Fiwalk 00:00:06 15 
Annotate File Names 00:00:02 15, 37, 152, 175 
BitCurator reports 00:00:03 15 
Bulk extractor, with default options and 
word list scanner 
00:00:04 
 
15 
 
Bulk extractor, with just email scanner 00:00:02 37 
 
Table 35 shows the fastest times in which a disk image was loaded into FTK, and 
indicates what image was used in the case, as well as what options were applied.  
Table 35: Fastest Time for adding Disk Image to a case in FTK 
MD5 SHA-
1 
SHA-
256 
Flag  
Duplicate 
Files 
File 
Signatu
re 
Flag 
Bad 
Ext. 
dtSea
rch 
Text 
Create 
Thumb
nails 
OCR Time Image 
Numb
er(s) 
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Analys
is 
Index for 
graphi
cs 
No No No No No No No No No 00:00:26 15 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:00:33 83, 
129, 
198 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 00:00:27 15 
No No No No No No No No Yes 00:00:23 152, 
175 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes 00:00:29 15, 
106, 
152,  
175 
No No No No No No No Yes No 00:00:27 15 
No No No No Yes Yes No No No 00:00:27 15 
Yes No No Yes No No No No No 00:00:26 15 
No No No No Yes No Yes No No 00:00:32 129 
 
Table 36 shows the fastest times in which a disk image was loaded into FTK, and 
indicates what image was used in the case, as well as what options were applied.  
Table 36: Slowest Time for adding Disk Image to a case in FTK 
MD5 SHA-
1 
SHA-
256 
Flag  
Duplicate 
File 
Signatu
Flag 
Bad 
dtSea
rch 
Create 
Thumb
OCR Time Image 
Numb
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Files re 
Analys
is 
Ext. Text 
Index 
nails 
for 
graphi
cs 
er(s) 
No No No No No No No No No 00:00:32 60 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 00:00:39 15 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 00:00:31 37, 
129 
No No No No No No No No Yes 00:00:30 198, 
221 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes 00:00:34 60 
No No No No No No No Yes No 00:00:33 60 
No No No No Yes Yes No No No 00:00:33 60 
Yes No No Yes No No No No No 00:00:35 60 
No No No No Yes No Yes No No 00:00:38 15 
 
Discussion 
One of the most surprising findings of this experiment was that it took so little 
time to perform the different tasks on the floppy disks. Many of the tasks took only half a 
minute, or even one second, to complete. It was also interesting that the time needed for a 
task often did not change even when I added different options to the task. For example, 
when I created a disk image of the floppy disk using Guymager, and selected the options 
to create an E01 image with a SHA-1 hash, it took 31 seconds to complete the task. When 
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I selected the same options, plus the option to verify the image, it still took 31 seconds to 
complete the task. 
On the other hand, it was also surprising how long it took to complete the forensic 
tasks on the external hard drive. As I stated previously, it took almost a hundred hours to 
create a disk image of a two terabyte hard drive using FTK.  Also, the size of the disk 
made completing the tasks more complicated. For example, because of the size of the 
hard drive, I had to make sure I saved the image of the hard drive on a completely empty 
drive on the computer. Initially, I tried to save it on a drive that contained a few other 
small files, and the program would not complete the task because there was not enough 
room on that computer drive to save the disk image.  
With these results in mind, it would be useful to consider when it would be 
“worth the time” for an institution to complete a certain task, and when they would want 
to select certain options for a task. For example, when would it be worth the time to 
create an MD5 hash when also creating a disk image? When would it be worth the time 
to use OCR?  There are many factors that might affect this decision. For example, how 
important are the materials to the institution? How do they fit into the collecting scope? 
Additionally, how will they be used? What kind of resources does the institution have? 
Does it have the staff and the time to devote to a lengthy project?  Do they have the 
storage capacity to store digital materials? The answers to these questions will be 
different for each institution, and could also vary across collections. However, with the 
results of this experiment in mind, it may be possible to begin to answer some of these 
questions. For example, in some cases, it would be valuable, and worth the time, to create 
a hash for a disk image. Doing so will help the institution to ensure the authenticity of the 
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materials. It will help them to know that the materials have not been changed because, as 
previously discussed, the hash will change if the data is changed even a little bit. It might 
also be valuable to flag duplicate materials. The institution might consider deleting these 
materials, which would save them storage space. Again, when I selected this option in 
creating the disk image of the floppy disk, it did not significantly increase the time 
needed to complete the task. 
Additionally, I was able to generate reports in the BitCurator environment about 
the disk images a few seconds, sometimes in just one second. These reports provide 
information that could be valuable to a collecting institution, such as metadata about the 
contents of the disk. Therefore, an institution could access this valuable information with 
a relatively low time commitment. However, if the institution had not already created a 
disk image, they would also have to factor in the time needed to do so, as they would 
need to first have a disc image before generating the reports.   
Institutions which are considering acquiring digital materials which have a large 
volume of storage, like the two terabyte hard drive, might also want to consider the time 
cost and other complications of these materials.  As I mentioned previously, when 
creating the disk image for the two terabyte hard drive, I had to save the disk to a 
completely empty drive. I was able to do this because I was using a FRED device, which 
has many drives available. However, it would be difficult to find that empty space if one 
was trying to do this task on a more standard desktop computer. Additionally, the process 
of creating the disk image was very time-consuming, and this may be frustrating to the 
institution. However, a hard drive such as the one in this experiment might contain 
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valuable materials, and it may be worth the time for an institution to create a disk image 
of the hard drive.  
Limitations 
One limitation of this study is that I did not record how long I spent setting up the 
tasks, including troubleshooting them when they went wrong, or figuring out exactly how 
to do a certain task. Although I had had previous exposure to the tools I used in this 
experiment, I still needed some time to familiarize myself with them before completing 
the tasks, and I did not record the time I spent on these activities. However, I devoted 
more time to these activities than to many of the tasks I recorded, so it may have been 
helpful to record them. However, it is also true that time spent on setting up and trouble-
shooting would be different for every individual, and every situation – it would depend 
on the software being used, and how familiar the person is with the particular task they 
need to do. Therefore, even if I had recorded the time I spend on these activities, it may 
not have been a reflection of a universal experience.  
It was also unfortunate that I was not able to perform more tasks on the external 
hard drive. However, I would not have been able to complete all those tasks in the 
allotted time for this study. Just creating the one disc image took several days.  
Another limitation of this study is that I did not have much variety of media to use 
in the testing, just the floppy discs and the external hard drive. It would be beneficial to 
perform these tests on different types of materials, and to see how long it took to 
complete the tasks using those materials.   
Additionally, there was also not much variety in the contents of the floppy disks I 
used. Most of the floppy disks were similar in that the contained WordPerfect documents, 
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data files, and other files of ASCII text. I would have liked to use a floppy disk that 
contained image files, such as JPEG. This would have likely created some variety in the 
time it took to complete some of the tasks. For example, if I had used OCR on a disk with 
images, it would have likely taken longer to create these tasks, as OCR is used with 
graphics.  
Additionally, this experiment was not meant to be an exhaustive study of every 
possible digital forensics task that could be performed, on every possible type of data. 
There are many data types and forensics tasks that were overlooked. Institutions may find 
that their data does not perfectly match that used in this experiment. For example, 
institutions may have data that has a larger file size than the data used in this experiment, 
or a small file size, or a different type of file format. There are many forms that data can 
take. There are also a great variety of forensic tasks that can be performed.  However, it is 
still possible that institutions could use these experiments as a guide. These experiments 
should give institutions a better idea of how time-consuming these tasks are. With these 
guides, hopefully institutions will be able to estimate the time needed to perform the 
tasks, while also considering the size of their data or their collections. 
Conclusion 
Digital forensics, although originally created for law enforcement officials, is now 
making its way into the world of archives and other cultural heritage institutions. Digital 
forensic tasks have the potential to help cultural heritage institutions manage, preserve 
and curate their digital materials. Despite this potential, institutions may be slow to adopt 
these practices, for a variety of reasons. For example, institutions could be concerned 
about how these tasks might drain their resources and how much time will be required to 
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complete a certain digital forensics task. However, the only way to know how much time 
a task will take is to complete the task. Thus, I undertook this experiment, in an effort to 
determine how long it would take to complete certain tasks.  
I performed a series of tasks on several floppy disks and an external hard drive. 
Often, I performed similar tasks with slight variations, in order to determine how much 
time would be needed for these variations. Whether an institution would want to apply 
these same variations would depend on their individual needs, and how much time they 
wanted to devote to the task. For example, some institutions might find it useful to also 
flag duplicate materials when creating a disk image, while others might not.  However, it 
is my hope that the results of this experiment will help institutions make these decisions. 
The results of this experiment will give others an idea of how long it would take to 
complete a certain task. With this in mind, the institution can then begin to consider 
whether this task would indeed be worth their time.
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